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ABSTRACT 
The earlier theories considered trade credit as a substitute for bank credit. Recent 
theories suggest that bank credit and trade credit can also be considered as two 
complementary sources of financing. By using South African panel data from 2007 to 
2015, the study examines if the problem of financial inclusion in South Africa can be 
mitigated by utilising trade credit data. The empirical findings using trade credit at 
current period are consistent with the earlier theories of trade credit that trade credit 
and bank credit are substitutes, but the model was not robust to estimation 
techniques.  The study also used the lagged trade credit as a variable of interest and 
found that it is positively related to bank credit. This means that the trade credit data 
from the previous period can facilitate access to bank credit. Therefore, the 
information from trade credit can serve as a signal about firms’ quality and thus 
facilitates access to bank finance.  
Key Terms: Bank credit/finance, Collateral, Complementary, Credit Bureau, 
Financially constrained, Financial Sector, Information, Reputation, Substitute, and 
Trade Credit 
JEL Classification: G32 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0. Introduction 
The South African financial services industry experienced significant adjustments, 
restructurings, regulatory, and technological changes (Basel ii and formation of a 
National Credit Register and the requirements on reckless lending in South Africa in 
2005). These have consequently reduced access to and extension of credit to the 
economy and changed the structure of credit portfolios that banks hold. Compared to 
established enterprises that can access equity finance and issue bonds, financially 
constrained enterprises are significantly affected by these changes as they depend 
more on the financial institutions for external finance. Banks are widely recognised as 
the main role players in supplying enterprises with external financing. However, the 
issue of creditworthiness is still a problem pertaining to access to bank credit. Creditors 
usually measure the creditworthiness based on ability and willingness to repay a loan. 
Owing to information asymmetries, not all information necessary to assess 
creditworthiness is available, resulting in a denial of credit/loan.  
An alternative for financially constrained enterprises is trade credit. Trade credit 
financing has become and to some, it is becoming a common phenomenon in both 
developing and developed economies. Trade credit is a practice of delaying payments 
when purchasing goods and services or simply credit purchase (Cuñat and Garcia-
Appendini, 2012). Contrary to trade credit providing an alternative finance, financial 
institutions may use the trade credit data to extend credit to financially constrained 
enterprises. Hence, the aim of the study is to determine the extent to which trade credit 
can facilitate access to bank credit.  
It is, therefore, possible for the suppliers to lend when banks cannot. This suggests that 
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bank credit and trade credit may be used as two substitutable sources of finance. 
Nonetheless, the use of trade credit data can lessen the credit constraint due to 
imperfect information and credit rationing (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and 
Ellingsen, 2004). Thus, the use of trade credit may act as an indicator or signal of 
creditworthiness by revealing supplier’s information to the bank, serving as a 
complementary to bank credit.  
There is also another way trade credit can serve as a complementary to bank credit. 
This is called the redistribution hypothesis that comes from the imperfect financial 
markets view of trade credit. This is based on a supposition that financially sound 
enterprises may redistribute credit to financially constrained enterprises in the form of 
trade credit. This hypothesis was supported by studies done by Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) and Nilsen (2002). 
1.1. Background to the study 
South Africa has a sophisticated financial system, which according to the National 
Treasury (2011) is sound and successfully weathered the financial crisis in 2008. The 
financial sector regulatory framework is up to date and effective. Hence, the banks and 
insurance companies enjoy healthy capitalisation levels, profitability, and investment 
reserves in South Africa (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008). The proportion of 
the population with access to bank accounts has increased significantly from 46% in 
2005 to 75% in 2013 (Finscope, 2013). Although there has been some progress in 
financial inclusion, according to the IMF (2008), expanding access to reliable and 
affordable services remains a challenge. As identified by the IMF, the key concern 
areas are access to bank accounts, lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
savings, and insurance products (IMF, 2008).  
According to Turner, Varghese, and Walker (2008), South Africa’s’ lending practices 
and the level of development of the financial services industry compare to that of the 
developed economies. However, credit access for South African enterprises is a “tale of 
two economies”, where the formal sector has in comparison to the informal economy 
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easy access to credit (Turner, et al. 2008). The very large informal sector lacks such 
access to credit (Turner, et al. 2008). The estimated range of the informal economy is 
varied, but most estimates are between 7% and 12% of the gross domestic product 
(GDP).  
A survey on small business suggested that the reasons for limited access to credit for 
financially constrained firms include lack of documentation, fixed income, financial 
records, customer uncertainty, and forecasting limitations (FinScope, 2006 in Turner et 
al. (2008)). Therefore, Turner et al. (2008) suggested that information solutions could 
help bridge the gap between informal and formal sectors and ease the conversion of the 
informal sector to the formal sector.  
On the other hand, access to credit plays a major role in economic growth. Policy 
makers have also acknowledged this nexus, for instance, The National Treasury 
(2011:1) stated: 
The financial services sector touches the life of every South African. It enables economic growth, 
job creation, the building of vital infrastructure and sustainable development for South Africa and 
her people. It is, therefore, crucial that the sector is well regulated and stable. However, stability is 
not the only policy objective for the financial sector. The sector is characterised by high and 
opaque fees and needs to be more transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Moreover, many 
South Africans do not have access to financial services. Not only does this inhibit economic 
growth, but it also keeps people trapped in poverty. 
This suggests that the inability of businesses to access adequate finance to start-up or 
grow is of concern to policy makers. New businesses can be financed from owners’ 
equity or by accessing external sources of finance whether formally from banks, venture 
capital companies, and private equity firms or informally from sources such as family 
and friends. Once a business is operating, it can be financed through retained earnings 
for further development. However, access to finance is a major problem experienced by 
South African entrepreneurs, and it ranks second as a factor for small new enterprise 
creation and high failure rate (Olawale and Garwe, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the two introduced sections of the National Credit Act in 2005 (formation 
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of a National Credit Register and the requirements on reckless lending) may have 
significant consequences on credit access. The reckless lending provisions necessitate 
lenders to make assessments to avoid giving loans to applicants who will become over-
indebted because of the loan. The NCA also stipulates that lenders use available 
information to conduct assessments to avoid giving loans that will push the borrower 
into over-indebtedness (Goodwin-Groen, 2006). 
Moreover, the competence to use information analytics is at an advanced level in South 
Africa and banks have the skills to use the information (Turner et al., 2008). The major 
South African banks use credit-scoring technology and have used such credit scores for 
a long period (Turner et al., 2008). Credit bureaus such as KreditInform and TransUnion 
market many business credit scores, and they rely on both private and commercial 
information. However, this is restricted to the first economy, yet many enterprises in the 
formal sector are unable to get access to business credit. According to Turner et al. 
(2008), South Africa needs to develop varieties of consumer payment information that 
the credit bureaus collect and enhance the reporting of trade credit information to credit 
bureaus (Turner et al., 2008). This can stimulate lending by large financial institutions. 
Nonetheless, the analyses of access to finance in South Africa seldom take into account 
the use of trade credit (Turner et al., 2008). 
In South Africa, the total credit provided to the economy has risen since 1994. Bank 
credit extended to the private sector as a percentage of GDP has since 1996 risen 
above 100%. Despite this growth of bank credit extended to the private sector, evidence 
indicates that South African enterprises are significantly dependent on trade credit. 
During 2007–2015, trade credit financed approximately 10% of the total assets of the 
sample enterprises; trade credit contributed 38% of total current liabilities and financed 
29% of current assets of the sample firm used in this study1. This is an indication that 
trade credit should not be ignored. According to the literature (Schwartz 1974); Petersen 
and Rajan, (1997); Fisman and Love, (2003), enterprises use trade credit to deal with 
financial constraints and to curb lack of finance from financial institutions.  
                                                          
1 Data obtained from Bureau Van Dijk (Orbis) 
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1.2. Problem statement 
Economic growth in South Africa has slowed significantly since 2011 and forecasts 
suggest growth would be less than 1 percent in 20162. Schumpeter (1934) argues the 
importance of new firm creation by saying that ‘new firms are the vital force behind the 
progress of capitalism’. New firms have high potential to provide and develop new 
products and technologies. “As an important source of innovation, new firms bring 
competitive pressure to bear on established firms”.  
 New firms are considered as an important element to solve South Africa’s development 
issues. As already stated, in South Africa, access to finance is relatively relaxed for 
formal sector while the informal sector lacks such access. Underhill Corporate Solutions 
(2011) analysed the SMEs financing gap in South Africa, where a “financing gap” refers 
to a sizable proportion of economically significant SMEs that cannot obtain credit.  They 
estimated the total financing gap at around 45-48% of all SMEs in South Africa.  
Based on a survey, Finmark Trust (2006) acknowledged that of the application for bank 
funding only 2% of new firms in South Africa receive funding. Foxcroft et al. (2002) 
study identified that 75% of new firms’ applications for bank credit in South Africa are 
rejected. Hence, lack of financial support for businesses is one of the factors for new 
firms’ failure. Thus, it suggests that lack of access to finance for new firms may impede 
survival and growth.  
Financial intermediaries mobilise excess funds from those with a surplus of capital to 
those with a shortage of funds and have projects that yield returns, the projects of which 
impact on productivity. To allocate financial resources efficiently, the financial sector 
needs to be well developed. This entails the ability to effectively get the information 
required, good regulations and accounting standard, provision of services at reasonable 
cost and the ability to pool risk across investment project in order to provide adequate 
investor return (Eichengreen, Gullapalli, and Panizza, 2009).  
                                                          
2 See 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/7278/FSR%20First%20edition%2020
16.pdf   Accessed 20 June 2016  
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However, automated underwriting has become more common. Hence, lenders are 
increasingly relying on the standardised data when providing credit. There is a default 
assumption in automated underwriting that insufficient information is equivalent to 
higher credit risk. This is why most lenders have a view that many South African 
entrepreneurs, especially in the informal sector, are high credit risk due to insufficient 
credit information (Turner et al., 2008). According to Turner et al. (2008), South Africa 
can move the well-established credit infrastructure to smaller but vital businesses by 
putting needed data in the credit bureaus.  
The literature on business finance in Africa usually focuses on bank credit.  However, 
banks are not the only major sources of external finance that African firms have access 
to; trade credit also plays a role.  The importance of trade credit is visible among new 
firms because trade credit is viewed as the first resort for entrepreneurs and constitutes 
an important element of a healthy economy (Staley and Morse, 1965). This is notable 
because, unlike bank credit, any formal collateral is not needed for trade credit. To 
develop an environment conducive for enterprises to thrive in, the government has to 
level the playing field. Therefore, if trade credit facilitates access to bank credit, then it 
raises some considerations attached to legal, regulatory, and policy reforms designed to 
promote trade credit information sharing and development. The importance of studying 
trade credit is elaborated under the significance for the study section.  
1.3. Aim and objectives of the study 
Economic growth is a complex phenomenon, which is determined by many complex 
structures. As the problem statement of the study indicated, it is argued that access to 
credit is essential for an economy to appeal to investors and enhance economic growth. 
The main aim of this research is to examine if trade credit can facilitate access to bank 
finance in South Africa. The study determines the objective by: 
 Analysing the lending condition in South Africa. 
 Identifying whether there is a correlation between selected measures of bank credit 
and trade credit in South Africa. 
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 Analysing and evaluating whether trade credit plays a signalling role for banks. 
 Based on the findings, propose policy measures that can improve information 
sharing and access to credit by enterprises. 
1.4. Significance/rationale for the study 
Any enterprise needs access to finance to start trading and to fund growth. Lack of such 
access to credit can constrain the business growth (Cassar, 2004). Furthermore, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) suggest that firms in countries with poorly developed financial 
institutions are forced to rely more on funds generated internally. The incompatibility of 
financial products currently on offer in the South African economy makes it difficult for 
enterprises to flourish and hence promote economic growth and achieve the objectives 
of the National Development Plan (NDP). Surveys that have been undertaken in South 
Africa provide reasons for limited access to credit. These include but not limited to lack 
of documentation, fixed income, financial records, and customer uncertainty and 
forecasting limitations (FinScope, 2006 in Turner et al. (2008)).   
This suggests that barriers to credit access emanate from information gaps. According 
to Turner et al. (2008), this gives the suggestion that effort to address information gaps 
may lead to broader lending, particularly for informal economy. The National Credit 
Regulator is considering this option in order to make trade credit information to be 
reported to the credit bureaus. According to Turner et al. (2008), this could help broaden 
access to financial credit for financially constrained firms in South Africa. The study 
intends to examine if the information from trade credit can facilitate bank credit.  
There is no empirical study yet to identify whether the information from trade credit can 
facilitate access to bank credit in South Africa. Among trade credit studies that have 
been carried out in South Africa, Kwenda and Holden (2014) is marginally closer to the 
objective of this study. Kwenda and Holden (2014) dealt with determinants of trade 
credit among South African listed firms. Otto (2014) dealt with the management of trade 
credit in SMEs while Kohler and Saville (2011) dealt with the determinants of access to 
trade credit by new SMEs in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. Olawale and 
Akinwumi (2010) focused on trade finance. The current study is the first to analyse if 
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trade credit data facilitate access to bank credit in South Africa. This will assist policy 
makers to determine if it is necessary to consider including the trade credit data in the 
credit bureaus. If trade credit significantly facilitates access to credit, it will influence the 
policy makers and credit bureaus to include trade credit data on their system, which in 
essence will provide more information about financially constrained enterprises and 
reduce their credit constraints. Increasing access to finance will enable enterprises to 
flourish and hence promote economic growth and achieve the objectives of the NDP. 
1.5. Outline of chapters  
The study is organised as follows: the first chapter introduced the study by determining 
the problem statement, aim and objectives of the study and the significance of the 
study. The second Chapter presents the literature review. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of the South African financial sector and trade credit developments. Chapter 4 
describes the econometric method, data sources, and variable selection. Chapter 5 
discusses the results and, Chapter 6 concludes the study, formulate policy 
recommendations and suggest areas for further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0. Introduction  
The development of the financial sector is important in stimulating economic growth. 
The financial sector contributes significantly to economic growth, among others, through 
the vast roles, such as allocating capital, savings mobilisation, technological changes 
promotion, and enabling the exchange of goods and services. Owing to market 
imperfections, the financial sector may not be able to provide its services to everyone. 
Specifically, owing to information asymmetry, some enterprises are financially 
constrained and are unable to receive funding from banks.  
 To alleviate funding problems, enterprises may try to raise funds from other non-
financial creditors, namely, the suppliers. Whenever a payment for goods and services 
does not occur concurrently when the goods and services are delivered, the supplier is 
ultimately extending a short-term credit to its customer. This is an important source of 
short-term funding for most enterprises and it is called trade credit. The foundation of 
the trade credit theory was first proposed by Meltzer (1960) dating back from the 1960s. 
There is an extensive literature focusing on trade credit as a source of finance. Most of 
the literature focuses on periods of tight/contractionary monetary policy with a focus on 
the developed financial markets, most particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States (US). Trade credit is give-and-take in nature, such that it represents an 
element of both liabilities and assets (Alatalo, 2010). For instance, most firms can obtain 
trade credit from their suppliers and extend trade credit to their customers.  
It is however not obvious why firms provide trade credit to their customers while there 
are many financial institutions specialised in providing finance. There are many theories 
that interrogate and describe this phenomenon. The theories of trade credit can be 
divided into two different categories and can fall in either or both demand and supply 
side theories of trade credit.  
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Firstly, several researchers have acknowledged transaction motives for using trade 
credit. Transaction motives state that trade credit can enable less frequent payments, 
thereby reducing transaction costs (Ferris, 1981). Trade credit could be utilised to gain a 
means to price discriminate between different customers (Brennan, Maksimovic, and 
Zechner, 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Another motive for trade credit is reducing 
informational asymmetries (Long, Ravid, and Malitz, 1993; Smith, 1987); and preserving 
the equity stake in the customer (Smith, 1987; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). These 
motives are elaborated in section 2.4.  
The other group of theories falls under the financing motive of trade credit. This group of 
theories emphasises motives that may give the supplier a financing advantage 
compared to other financial intermediaries in providing credit to the customer. The 
financing motives range from the suppliers greater advantage in monitoring their 
customers, (Mian and Smith, 1992; Jain, 2001), ability of suppliers to control the 
customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Cuñat, 2007), and higher recouping value of the 
collateral (Mian and Smith, 1992; Frank and Maksimovic, 2004). 
The financing motive suggests that the decision to use trade credit may differ depending 
on the accessibility of other sources of funding. This has formed the basis of the trade 
credit theory, which suggests that during the contractionary monetary policy period, 
enterprises increase their trade credit accounts (Kohler, Britton, and Yates, 2000; 
Nilsen, 2002; Mateut, Bougheas, and Mizen, 2006). This entails that trade credit can be 
used as a substitute for other sources of financing. The theory also postulates that firms 
that are financially strong and less susceptible to a reduction in money supply 
redistribute funds to the financially constrained firms in a form of trade credit (Nilsen, 
2002).  
 On the other hand, as a financing motive, the use of trade credit can alleviate the credit 
constraint that firms may have due to imperfect information and credit rationing. Thus, 
the trade credit information can be used as a signal to the banks by revealing the 
suppliers’ information to the bank (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
For instance, Tateka and Udell (2007) find some evidence of trade credit and bank 
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credit acting as complements rather than a substitute. 
This chapter first examines trade credit theories to emphasise the importance of trade 
credit and its financial intermediary role. This also describes the aspect influencing trade 
credit use and the motives and factors of using trade credit. Finally, the last section 
analyses the empirical evidence and more specifically the relationship between bank 
credit and trade credit discussed in previous research. 
2.1. Overview of lending condition 
The financial intermediaries including trade credit suppliers contribute significantly to 
economic growth, among others, through the many roles, such as capital allocation, 
mobilising savings, promoting technological changes, and enabling the exchange of 
goods and services. According to Sirri and Tufano (1995), lack of access to multiple 
investors may induce the production processes to be constrained to economically 
inefficient scales.  This is exacerbated by the ‘market of lemon’ dilemma described by 
Akerlof (1970) where quality and uncertainty are related in the automobile market 
(investor may not be willing to lend their fund where there is quality uncertainty).  
Therefore, mobilising savings is one of the essential functions of financial 
intermediaries. The process of mobilising savings comprises of accumulation of capital 
from a group of different savers for investment. This consists of having to overcome the 
transaction costs that are linked with an assortment of savings from different individuals. 
Financial intermediaries also need to overcome asymmetries of informational linked to 
making savers comfortable with giving control of their savings. Inability to overcome 
information asymmetries requires enterprises to find alternative funding mechanisms.  
Financial intermediation is also important because it is cumbersome and costly for 
individual savers to assess the true intention of firms’ managers and different conditions 
in the market. In most cases, individuals lack the time and capacity to gather and 
process information on many groups of enterprises, managers and economic conditions 
(Djoumessi, 2009). On the other hand, it is possible for borrowers to have more 
information than lenders regarding their projects. Consequently, this can cause 
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information problem, which may create the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazards. Moreover, savers may be hesitant to invest their money in the project in which 
they have inadequate information. This may discourage savers from investing, hence, 
precluding capital from flowing into its optimal use.  
However, financial institutions are able to monitor borrowers after providing funding. 
Financial institutions do so to make sure that borrowers use the finances for their 
intended use. Without the monitoring, managers may stray from the initial objectives of 
the enterprise, and this may cause the business to fail. According to Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), the lack of financial agreements used to enhance the corporate control may 
hamper the savings mobilisation, thereby preventing capital from flowing to profitable 
investments.  
Financial intermediaries also support individuals to buy now and pay at a later stage. 
This enhances efficiency in the economy and expands the production technologies 
available to the economy. According to Li (2011), well-developed financial institutions 
enable better allocation of financial resources to fund projects that have the highest 
returns. Rajan and Zingales (1998) focused on the allocative role of trade credit, and 
they identified that firms with a substantial need for external finance can only develop at 
a faster rate in well-developed financial markets. According to Rajan and Zingales 
(1997), this can then implore the question whether firms with projects that would yield a 
high return in poor developed financial markets can take steps to alleviate the effects of 
poor financial markets. Rajan and Zingales (1997) then state that firms are required to 
rely more on funds generated internally or trade credit. In most cases, these challenges 
stem from information asymmetry and lack of collateral. 
Collateral can play an important role in curbing the challenges of acquiring credit. The 
main principle of collateral lies in granting the first preference to a creditor in recovering 
credit through some property belonging to the debtor in case of default. This is done by 
necessitating that the creditor has a secured interest. In the event of default, collateral 
provides the creditor with a secured interest priority over the general claims of 
13 
 
unsecured creditors to sell the item to recover the loan. In a collateralised system, 
creditors must have the legal right to take possession of the assets over which the 
debtors have ownership rights. 
In most cases, the credit constraints faced by borrowers with a demand for bank credit 
is largely based on information asymmetry. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
credit rationing can be an outcome in light of adverse selection and moral hazard. As 
such, firms with profitable projects or investment opportunities are unable to pursue 
them because credit providers cannot verify the quality of the project, or face a moral 
hazard problem where it is hard to ensure that funds are not used to finance other 
riskier projects that were not considered by the supplier of funds. The availability of 
collateral can deal with the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard because 
collateral increases the probability that the lender will recover the loan by making default 
costly (Li, 2011).  
Collateral has also been motivated as a means to alleviate information asymmetries. 
Therefore, collateral and information asymmetries views are highly correlated. The more 
severe the information asymmetry between the borrower and the bank, the more likely 
the firm is to default. Therefore, collateral can effectively substitute for information. 
According to Li (2011), these conditions include that the legal system functions properly, 
the value of collateral should be adequate, and the collateral value should not erode 
over time. However, financially constrained and small firms lack adequate assets to 
pledge as collateral. Hence, bank funding is not simply available to small firms. This 
inclines them to depend on inside finance. Growth over time may allow access to 
external private equity and debt and ultimately to public equity and debt markets. This 
suggests that a small firm’s probability of securing an external debt contract is positively 
related to the value of assets that it can pledge as collateral (Li, 2011). 
Nevertheless, according to Li (2011), the need for collateralised lending can be reduced 
by improving the information available to lenders. In order to evaluate the customers’ 
creditworthiness and possible default risk, both suppliers and banks need information. 
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Suppliers compared to banks have better and cheaper channels they can use to obtain 
information of customers. Hence, according to Jain (2001), trade creditors can play a 
role by being the second layer between banks and borrowers. Therefore, banks may 
choose to lend money to suppliers instead of customers to avoid high evaluation costs 
in an industry with many customers. Frank and Maksimovic (2004) specified that the 
redistributive role that acts as a second layer is helpful. The second layer enables 
suppliers and customers to diminish the need for external finance. This is more 
evidence if the financial market is inefficient and the market where suppliers have more 
power. 
Furthermore, financially constrained enterprises may use trade credit as a substitute. 
Schwartz (1974) emphasises that the impact of monetary control is alleviated by trade 
credit. This entails that during the monetary constraint period, firms that have access to 
other financing institutions may have the will to offer trade credit to customers. If the 
bank interest is higher than trade credit costs, customers would be more likely to use 
trade credit. Nevertheless, it is possible for suppliers to have information advantages 
over banks.  This possibility exists to suppliers because they can assess a firm’s 
financial performance, repossess, and resell goods in case of default. Therefore, trade 
credit can also be considered as a technique to alleviate information asymmetry, 
because trade credit information if used can signal firms’ creditworthiness to banks. 
Extensive studies have been done during the past four decades to determine the 
theories of trade credit. According to a survey by the IMF (2009), approximately 60% of 
the international trade transactions are financed through trade credits. The literature on 
trade credits provides numerous justifications why firms rely on trade credit financing.  
2.2. What is trade credit 
Trade credit is give-and-take in nature such that it represents a substantial element of 
both assets and liabilities (Alatalo, 2010). Firms can obtain trade credit from their 
suppliers and extend trade credit to their customers. On the books, obtaining credit from 
suppliers is called accounts payable, creditors, or trade payables. Extending trade credit 
to the customer is called accounts receivable, debtor or trade receivables.  
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2.2.1. Accounts Payable 
Usually, the literature refers to accounts payable as trade credit. Trade credit 
transactions generally comprise short-term deferred payment of purchases of goods or 
services.  Through the deferral of payment, trade creditors are effectively funding their 
customers with short-term debt and can be called credit purchases. Cash is only paid 
on maturity of the accounts payable. From the firm point of view, accounts payable 
represent liabilities because of the credit purchases of goods or services that will need 
to be repaid later. 
Compared to other creditors or corporate debt, trade credit has three main differences: 
 Suppliers  do not lend money, they lend ‘in kind’; 
 Provision of trade credit generally does not require the formal contracts(contrast to 
bank credit) between the lender and the borrower; and 
 Non-financial firms issue trade credit. 
 
2.2.2. Accounts receivable 
Accounts receivable is the amount owed by the customers for good or services sold to 
the customers on credit instead of cash, allowing customers to pay later than the time of 
purchase. Cash from credit sales or accounts receivable is only generated on the 
maturity of the accounts receivable and that the sale of goods or services on credit 
converts an enterprise’s finished goods into accounts receivable (Otto, 2014). From the 
enterprise's point of view, accounts receivable denote liquid assets because of the 
credit sale of goods or services (Barad, 2010). The total value of accounts receivable is 
allocated on the asset side of the enterprise’s balance sheet.   
Accounts receivable is, in most cases, a significant portion of current assets. A number 
of factors determine the size of accounts receivable. In most cases, these factors may 
differ from an enterprise to enterprise, and differ according to the nature of the industry 
(García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010). The factor can range from the seasonal 
nature of sales and specific seasons for the enterprise etc. The reason for providing 
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credit sales is to expand sales, which may increase the profit levels and ultimately 
increase the liquidity of the enterprise. 
 A firm that sustains a high proportion of account receivable to cash sale is considered 
to have a high level of investment in account receivable if it is dealing with a high sales 
volume. In instances where most of the customers are considered creditworthy and 
financially stable, the firm can operate with less invested in accounts receivable 
because all payments are received within a short period of time (Otto, 2014).    
When providing credit sales, firms need credit policy. An enterprise with a lenient credit 
policy has comparatively larger accounts receivable than an enterprise with a more rigid 
credit policy. This is mainly because a lenient credit policy may lead to high default rate 
by financially weak, which may result in a high volume of accounts receivable.  To 
encourage early payments, debtors are offered cash discounts. A cash discount 
provides an incentive to persuade early payment/payment within the stipulated period or 
before the end of the credit period. Cash discount is an offer to pay less if the customer 
pays within the period agreed upon (Otto, 2014).  
2.3. The use of trade credit 
According to Li (2011), the aspect that influences trade credit usage includes the 
relationship between suppliers and customers, the relationship between customers and 
banks and other financing institutions, monetary policy and savings in monitoring 
customer costs for banks. Suppliers are critical players in trade credit financing (Burkart 
and Ellingsen, 2004). Petersen and Rajan (1994) supported this view and emphasised 
the importance of relationships between suppliers and customers on the level of the 
trade credit.  Reason being that, the relationship between suppliers and customers 
allows the suppliers to monitor the customer behaviour. To support the notion, Nilsen 
(2002) also argues that trade credit transpires during the sale of goods and services 
between suppliers and customers.  
Nilsen (2002) argues that trade credit use is linked to the monetary policy. Following to 
this view, trade credit is considered a substitute for bank credit even though it might not 
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be the optimal choice (Nilsen, 2002). This view supports that small firms resort to trade 
credit during the tight monetary policy period. Nilsen (2002) predicted that in contrast to 
small firms, large firms with more credit channels tend to avoid trade credit.  
2.4. Motives of trade credit 
Trade credit theories can be divided into two categories, namely; the transaction 
motives and financing motives. Transaction motives can range from reducing 
transaction cost by making payments less frequently, gaining a mean to price 
discriminate, reducing informational asymmetries, and preserving the equity stake in the 
customer. The second group of theories falls under the financing motives for the use of 
trade credit. The financing motives range from the suppliers greater advantage in 
monitoring customers, the ability to control the customer, and higher recouping value of 
the collateral. 
The financing motive also suggests that firms’ decision to use trade credit depend on 
the availability of other sources of finance. This hypothesis laid the ground for the trade 
credit theory, which proposes that trade credit may substitute traditional sources of 
finance. Contrary to that, trade credit can act as a complement rather than a substitute 
to bank credit. 
2.4.1. Transactions motive 
According to Ferris (1981), the supply of both goods and finance combined from one 
source can lead to cost advantages and a reduction in transaction costs. The customer 
does not have to bear the transaction cost of buying good and getting funding 
separately. This can, in turn, improve the cash flow forecast and simplify the 
management of cash. In addition, transaction costs can be reduced if provisions of all 
goods and services are accumulated and paid for at the same time. Furthermore, the 
unpredictability because of fluctuations in daily sales can be reduced through 
enterprises offering trade credit or credit sales. Based on the terms offered, suppliers 
are in a better position to know the date in which customers are likely to settle their 
accounts. The better knowledge that supplier gain from customer behaviour may lead to 
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better forecasts that ease the necessity for firms to keep large amounts of cash, and 
this can subsequently reduce the cost of having to hold precautionary cash balances.  
2.4.1.1. Price discrimination 
Trade credit may be offered in a situation where the supplier does not have a financing 
advantage over financial institutions because trade credit can be used for price 
discrimination. The theories such as Meltzer (1960), Brennan et al (1988), and Mian and 
Smith (1992) supported this.  The terms of trade credit generally never change upon the 
changes to the credit quality of the customer. Hence, trade credit may reduce the 
effective price that the low-quality borrowers pay.  
Price discrimination can lead suppliers to extend credit to their customers (Meltzer, 
1960; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that suppliers 
normally provide discounts for customers who pay early. Therefore, the prices are 
different for early payment and late payment (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010; 
Atanasova, 2007; Guariglia and Mateut, 2006). Given that credit terms are uniform for 
customers with different credit quality, low-quality customers can enjoy an effective 
reduction in the price of goods and services (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Low-credit 
quality firms have comparatively inelastic demand, allowing suppliers to exploit high-
profit margins (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). High-quality borrowers consider the price of 
trade credit as too high, motivating them to make repayments quickly. Contrary to that, 
risky customers find the cost of trade credit lower than other sources of funding.  
2.4.1.2. Advantage in information acquisition 
The information hypothesis holds that supplier may visit the customer more often; 
hence, the size and timing of the customer's orders can give them an idea of the 
condition of the customer's business. If a customer fails to take advantage of early 
payment discounts can serve as an alert to the supplier of customers’ weakening 
creditworthiness. Financial intermediaries may be able to collect similar information, but 
the theory holds that the supplier can get the information quicker and cheaper because 
suppliers obtained this kind of information in the ordinary course of business (Li, 2011). 
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Hence, banks are hesitant to be exclusive lenders because they face a “market of 
lemon” dilemma. However, banks may become convinced to lend if they observe that 
suppliers extend credit to a particular customer.  
Asymmetric information is also evident in the product markets. This implies that there is 
uncertainty about the quality of goods from suppliers. By offering trade credit, customers 
are given a period in which they can use to verify the quality of the product before they 
pay (Smith, 1987). Hence, trade credit can then provide a positive indication of the 
quality of the product by giving the customer a period to inspect the product through 
deferred payment.  
 Ferris (1981) expands on this and argues that the decision to take trade credit depends 
on the availability and relative prices of alternative finance. As a result of equilibrium, 
firms may demand trade credit at rates higher than those required by banks and other 
financial institutions where there is credit-rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Given that 
credit rationing by banks is a function of risk, high-risk firms are likely to have a higher 
demand for trade credit. 
Moreover, trade credit demands rise because of suppliers’ relaxed collateral 
requirements compared to banks (Fafchamps, 1997). The most important aspect of 
trade credit is the relationship between the supplier and the customer as it may provide 
reliable information that improves the enforcement and monitoring of payments 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Therefore, it suggests that trade credit depends more on 
the relationship and is less dependent on formal collateral. To support this supposition, 
Cunat (2004) has developed a model that indicates that if a firm has a lower level of 
assets that can be collateralised the demand for trade credit is expected to be higher. 
2.4.1.3. Preserving the equity stake in the customer  
According to Alatalo (2010), a supplier might not favour riskier customers exclusively to 
boost sales in the short-term. However, suppliers may also have a long-term interest in 
the survival of the customer firm to preserve the equity stake in the customer. In this 
instance, the supplier does not only consider the current sales and profit margin, but 
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they may also need to take into consideration the present value of the profit margins on 
future sales to that customer (Alatalo, 2010). This is usually the case if the supplier has 
few alternative customers or where the supplier has provided a “non-salvageable 
investment” on the customer (Smith, 1987; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Suppliers may 
also provide a lenient liquidation policy for defaulters than banks, which do not hold 
much implicit equity stake in their borrowers (Huyghebaert, 2006; Huyghebaert, Van de 
Gucht and Van Hulle, 2001). Thus, firms that value having control rights may limit their 
bank borrowings and take up more trade credit (Alatalo, 2010). Huyghebaert (2006) 
argues that when ownership of start-up firms is concentrated in the entrepreneurs’ 
hands, firms borrow more from their suppliers. 
2.4.2. Financing motive 
The financing motive of trade credit holds that it is possible for suppliers to have an 
advantage over banks in examining the creditworthiness of their customers. Suppliers 
are also more able than banks to monitor and enforce payment of the credit. These may 
give suppliers a cost advantage over financial institutions. Schwartz (1974) motivates 
this and Meltzer (1960) proposed that financially constrained firms with limited access to 
bank credit increase the use of trade credit. In addition, Meltzer (1960) proposed that 
during the tight monetary policy period for instance in the mid-50s, firms with relatively 
high cash balances extended the average time for which trade credit was granted, and 
thus financed businesses that were discriminated with credit constraints by banks. 
Mateut et al. (2006), incorporated trade credit into a theoretical framework and indicated 
that trade credit takes its place during tight monetary policy period as bank lending is 
restricted for financially constrained firms.  
One of the oldest views explains trade credit as something that emanates from the 
imperfections of the financial market. This can be referred to as the financial motive of 
trade credit and arises due to financial markets imperfections. The imperfection arises 
from the possibility of some firms having easier access to fund than their customers, 
which may then encourage them to utilise their capacity to borrow and pass credit to 
their customers (Schwartz, 1974).  Emery (1984) therefore argues that hurdles to bank 
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credit that experienced by financially constrained firms and the resulting “non-
competitive rents” provide suppliers with an opportunity to extend credit. 
According to Emery (1984), the imperfect market’s view of trade credit can lead to the 
argument that banks redistribute credit from financially sound firms to financially 
constrained firms in the form of trade credit, using suppliers as a middle man. According 
to Love, Lorenzo, and Virginia (2005), redistribution can occur if some firms (financially 
sound) can raise external credit that they then pass on to constrained firms.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic (2001) proposed an argument that is related to the 
redistribution argument. The complementary view of Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic 
claims countries with large and efficient financial sectors use trade credit substantially. 
Non-financial financially sound firms act as agents for the financial intermediaries by 
advancing credit to and borrowing from other firms when they have a comparative 
advantage in enforcing credit contracts.  
The recent theory falling under financing motive of trade credit focuses on information 
asymmetry. The theory hold that use of trade credit can alleviate the credit constraint 
that firms may have due to imperfect information and credit rationing. Thus, the trade 
credit data can be used as a signal to the banks by revealing the supplier's information 
to the bank (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
All theories that fall under financing motive of trade credit are due to some advantages 
that suppliers have over banks. Suppliers have advantages in controlling customer and 
an advantage in salvaging the value from existing assets.  
2.4.2.1. Advantage in controlling the customer 
It is possible for the supplier to have an advantage over banks in controlling the 
customer. This possibility arises if there are few alternatives financial sources other than 
the particular supplier of the good/service. In this case, the supplier can control the 
customer in different ways. The supplier can give the customer threat of cutting off the 
future supplies in the event that the customer shows sign of defaulting on their 
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repayment. However, financial institutions have limited powers to threaten their 
borrowers and the threat to withdraw future finance may have little immediate effect on 
the borrower's operations (Mian and Smith, 1992). Furthermore, the financial 
institution's ability to withdraw past finance may be constrained by bankruptcy laws 
(Mian and Smith, 1992). 
2.4.2.2. Advantage in salvaging the value from existing assets 
The supplier is in a better position to salvage the value of existing assets. If the 
customer defaults on the payment, the supplier can take the goods supplied. The extent 
to which the intermediate goods supplied can serve as collateral also affects the 
willingness of suppliers to extend trade credit (Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997). The durable the goods supplied, the valuable they are as collateral and 
hence the more credit the supplier can extend to customers. In addition, the longer the 
intermediate goods remain in their original state, the more useful they are as collateral 
to the seller who can repossess them and sell them to another customer. This means 
that the state and quantity of raw materials held in inventory by customers has an 
impact on the decision of suppliers to provide trade credit.  
Frank and Maskimovic (2004) explain that inputs provide collateral supporting trade 
credit while finished goods do not. The proportion of the sale that is financed by trade 
credit increases with the value that can be recovered in the event of repossession. 
Furthermore, supplier cost of repossessing and reselling the product supplied is lower 
than that of a financial institution because the supplier has a network for selling its 
goods, and the goods repossessed are ordinarily in their line of business.  
2.5. Factors of trade credit 
According to Li (2011), many factors influence trade credit. Some of these factors are 
linked to the economic development of a country, such as financial systems, legal 
structures, GDP, market interest rate and monetary policy. These factors are 
considered to form part of macroeconomic factors. On the other hand, there are firm-
specific factors that are controllable by the firm. 
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2.5.1. Macroeconomic factors 
As already mentioned, trade credit is influenced by the development of the financial 
system; legal structure of the country and monetary policy. SMEs rely on the trade 
credit during the tight monetary policy periods, as they are prone to experience financial 
problems during those periods (Li, 2011). Furthermore, also linked to the monetary 
policy, Niskanen and Niskanen (2006) stated there is a relationship between the market 
interest rate and trade credit. This is based on the assumption that higher market 
interest rate increases the probability of trade credit taken as an alternative.  
As already stated, the financial system is also a macroeconomic factor of trade credit. In 
this regards, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) stated that financial intermediaries 
could easily monitor borrowers in the well-developed financial market. Firms in the Well-
developed financial market can easily receive funding directly from the financial 
institutions. However, the weak financial market may depend on non-financial 
institutions because firms lack financial access from other financial institutions.  
A well-developed legal infrastructure in a country also contributes as a macroeconomic 
factor (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). If a country has a well-developed legal 
infrastructure, creditors have strong legal protection against borrowers’ default. Such a 
protection can encourage financial institutions to extend collateral or security backed 
credit. As such, trade credit can be negatively related to the good legal system.  
Contrary to the theories above, Niskanen and Niskanen (2006) justified that trade credit 
can increase during the period of high macroeconomic development. Their justification 
leans toward investment opportunities. During high macroeconomic development, 
investment opportunities tend to rise. Therefore, firms may resort to trade credit to focus 
their attention on the investment opportunities and support their operations.  
2.5.2. Firm-specific factors 
Suppliers and their customers decide on the size of trade credit to advance or borrow. 
Accounts receivable is determined by the ability of the firm to extend credit and the 
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extent to which they are willing to provide credit to its customers. Account receivable is 
also dependent on the demand from customers and their willingness to use trade credit. 
Hence, accounts receivable is dependent on a couple of firm characteristics, which can 
be called the determinants of trade credit. Among many, this includes firm’s 
creditworthiness, ability to obtain financial debt and the cost of financial debt relating to 
sales growth and gross profit margin. 
Firstly, firm’s creditworthiness is one of the most important determinants of trade credit 
discussed in several kinds of literature. Firm’s creditworthiness is an indication of a 
firm’s ability to obtain alternative finance and its credit capacity and reputation. 
Creditworthiness is usually measured by firm age and size (Li, 2011). Hence, many 
authors demonstrated that large enterprises could achieve trade credit requirements 
easily (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Danielson and Scott, 2004). Creditworthiness shares 
the same interpretation as the ability to obtain financial debt, which measures the 
capacity of a firm to access external funding.  
The third determinant is the cost of financial debt. The higher the financial costs the 
lesser the incentive to offer trade credit and the more the incentive to resort to trade 
credit. Therefore, Nilsen (2002) argued that during the period of tight monetary periods, 
the cost of bank credit might be higher than trade credit. As a result, the level of trade 
credit can be increased. 
The fourth factor is related to sales growth.  This element is explained from the 
accounts receivable point of view. According to Petersen and Rajan (1997), firms 
needing to achieve high sales growth are high likely to accept trade credit transactions. 
This entails that there is a positive relationship between sales growth and trade credit. 
Emery (1984) demonstrated that firms with low sale growth are more likely to grant 
more trade credit as a marketing tool. Gross profit margin is the last factor of trade 
credit and its interpretation is similar to sales growth factor. According to Emery (1984), 
firms with a high gross profit margin attempt to achieve high sales by granting more 
trade credit.  
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2.6. Empirical literature review 
Having considered the relevant theories underlying the trade credit and bank credit 
nexus, it is important to review the empirical research that has been conducted on trade 
credit. In determining whether trade credit plays a role in financial intermediation, many 
researchers looked at the relationship between different determinants of trade credit 
and accounts payable and/or accounts receivable. Contrary to that, only a few studies 
focused on the theories provided by Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen 
(2004), which argue that trade credit data can be used as a signal to the banks by 
revealing the supplier's information to the bank. The difficulty in testing theories of trade 
credit so far has been the lack of data, but based on available data, there have been 
some interesting findings. 
This study provides empirical evidence according the findings or results. For every 
study listed below, where it is possible the sample period, countries used, the data, 
dependent variables, independent variables, the econometric model used is discussed, 
and few remarks are provided. There are different views and empirical research on 
transaction motive and the financing motive of trade credit. However, the most studied 
in the economics literature is whether trade credit plays a substitutive or complementary 
role in financial intermediation. Other researchers view trade credit as a substitute to 
bank credit, others perceive it as a complementary to bank credit, and on the other 
hand, others has mixed results. Most of this empirical evidence is based on developed 
countries, such as UK and US, with only a few based on African countries. 
2.6.1. Trade credit and bank credit are substitutes 
There are several empirical studies that studied the hypothesis that trade credit 
becomes a substitute for bank financing in periods where firms experience credit 
constraints. Among these studies, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1997) analysed the US 
small firms using survey data in the late 1980s. The studies used the standard 
simultaneous equations techniques and find that during the tight monetary policy 
periods, small firms are likely to be bank credit rationed and they react by opting for 
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trade credit. These are the most widely cited empirical works on trade credit. They 
found that firms of higher credit quality receive more credit than firms of low credit 
quality. In addition, the size and timing of the customer’s orders indicate the state of 
customer’s business. Their results also showed that the higher the proportion of raw 
materials in inventory, the greater the amount of trade credit provided. They also drew 
the conclusion that suppliers have a financing advantage stemming from suppliers 
ability to acquire information at low cost and their ability to liquidate their assets 
efficiently. 
Also based in the US, Nilsen (2002) used the quarterly aggregate balance sheet data of 
US firms to investigate the role of trade credit within the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission. The study used the Vector Autoregressive Models using 
accounts payable as the dependent variable and inventory, and liquidity as the 
independent variable. The study also used accounts receivable as a dependent variable 
along with macro variables such as; GDP, price level, and the monetary policy indicator 
(interest spread) as independent variables using time-series regressions. The study 
found that the time-series regressions for small firms increase trade credit use during 
monetary contractions and among large firms, only unrated firms increase trade credit 
use during contractions. 
Huyghebaert (2006) examined the theoretical predictions using 328 start-ups’ panel 
data over 1992 to 2002. The study used the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
random effects panel estimation. The dependent variable was the ratio of accounts 
payable to total assets. The independent variables were firm age, firm size (logarithm of 
total assets), and the start-up’s ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets to serve as 
collateral for bank credit. The study concluded that start-ups are more likely to use trade 
credit when there are financially constrained, when suppliers have a financing 
advantage over banks, when entrepreneurs value private benefits of control and when 
transaction costs are important.  
Guariglia and Mateut (2006) used the UK quoted companies’ data from 1980 to 2000 
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and estimated the error-correction inventory investment equations (because some 
independent variables reflected the influence of a long-run target inventory level) 
extended with the coverage ratio and the trade credit to assets ratio. They carried out 
regression using a first-difference GMM method. Their study differentiated the effects of 
the variables across firms that are more likely to face financing constraints and firms 
that are making high or low use of trade credit. To test for offsetting effect of the credit 
channel, they used an augmented version of the equation. The study concluded that in 
the UK, trade credit rises during the periods when monetary policy is tight, and bank 
lending falls. 
 Atanasova (2007) investigated the information on a panel of limited liability UK firms 
from 1981 to 2000 and estimated a switching regression model. According to Atanasova 
(2007), “Endogenous switching allows for possible correlation between the shocks to 
the demand for trade credit with the shocks to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial and other characteristics”. 
The variable used in the study were age, industry, and year dummies, the vector Z, 
which includes a set of variables that are indicators of ﬁnancial strength and the vector 
X, which includes a set of observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, industry-wide averages, 
and industry and year dummies. The study concluded that trade credit is a substitute for 
bank credit when firms are financially constrained.  
 Also based in the UK, Cuñat (2004) developed a model in which trade credit arises 
from the commercial and technological links between firms. Based on a sample of UK 
firms, he found that trade credit increases with firm age. According to Cuñat (2004), 
trade credit is used once other forms of credit have been fully utilised. He also finds that 
the share of trade credit relative to other types of finance is significantly affected by 
collateral. Lower levels of collateral are associated with a higher proportion of trade 
credit. This is considered to be consistent with the view that firms exhaust other sources 
of credit before using trade credit.  
Using the accounting information for UK manufacturing, retail and wholesale firms over 
1993 to 2002, Cuñat (2007) tested the theoretical model that commercial ties between 
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firms imply that suppliers are better able than banks to enforce non-collateralised debt 
repayment, and suppliers provide liquidity to customers with temporary difficulties. The 
study used the individual fixed effects and a GMM method. The dependent variables 
used were trade credit divided by total assets and trade credit divided by total debt and 
the independent variables were the age of the firm in days, the annual growth rate of 
assets, liquid assets, and collateral. The study concluded that the levels of trade credit 
are higher when firms experience liquidity shocks.  
 Wilson and Summers (2002) investigated the determinants of trade credit usage for a 
sample of small UK firms. They concluded that firms with a higher degree of financial 
risk (proxied by profitability and the debt ratio) have a greater demand for trade credit. 
Business risk (proxied by firm age) is positively related to trade credit demand and firms 
with more concentrated ownership use relatively more trade credit. 
Tsuruta (2008) and Ogawa, Sterken, and Tokutsu (2011) looked at the Japan market to 
examine whether trade and bank credits are substitutes. Tsuruta (2008) examined the 
sample of Japanese SMEs between 1997 and 2001 and performed fixed effects 
regression. The study used accounts payable-debt ratio and accounts payable-asset 
ratio as dependent variables. The independent variables consisted of firm characteristic 
variables (Scale, firm age, and demand for short-term credit), performance (return on 
assets and sales growth) and credit terms with banks (tangible asset ratio and interest 
rate). The study concluded that when the interest rate the bank sets is too high, the 
proportion of accounts payable rises and the bank loses its amount of loans. 
 Ogawa et al. (2011) used cross-sectional survey data on Japanese SMEs to conduct 
and investigate whether bank credit and trade credit are substitutes. The proportion of 
intermediate goods purchased from large suppliers was their dependent variable.  
Sales, Profit (the ratio of operating profit to sales), Debt (the debt-asset ratio), Bank-
Depend (customer’s dependence on the bank credit), and the industry dummies were 
independent variables used to estimate the model. They concluded that SMEs with little 
access to bank credit are dependent more on large suppliers for trade credit, which 
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suggests that trade credit and bank credit are substitutes.  
Molina and Preve (2012) studied the sample of 85,727 US firms from Compustat that 
have accounts payable data available from 1978 to 2000 to estimate the equation using 
both fixed effects and pooled OLS. The study focused on the firms in financial distress 
and their use of supplier’s trade credit. The dependent variable was trade credit 
measured in three different ways (account payable, account receivable and net trade 
credit). The independent variables consisted of financial distress dummy variable, 
financial leverage, sales growth and the dummy representing years in financial distress. 
They study concluded that firms that are financially distressed use substantial volume of 
trade credit to substitute for other sources of finance. Especially smaller firms, that has 
less market power, and exclusive products tend to use more trade credit financing when 
they are financially distressed. However, they made an interesting observation that firms 
that increase their accounts payable substantially when facing financial distress, 
experience a drop of at least 11% in sales and profitability growth. This supports the 
substitution hypothesis.  
Danielson and Scott (2004) estimated their model using the 1995 firm-level data 
conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business. The model was 
estimated using a simultaneous equation using the bivariate probit method. The study 
modelled the trade credit demand as a function of bank loan availability, trade credit 
price, and firm/industry characteristics. They found that firms increase their demand for 
trade credit when facing credit constraints from banks, hence trade credit serving as a 
substitute for bank credit.  
Carbó-valverde, et al (2016) using over 40,000 Spanish SMEs firm-level panel data 
analysed whether trade credit is an alternative source of external finance to SMEs 
during the financial crisis. The study used the Max likelihood method, using bank credit 
as the dependent variable and sales, cash flow, loan interest spread and the GDP 
growth as independent variables. Like other recent studies using European SME data, 
they study concluded that there is significant evidence that trade credit is an alternative 
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source of external finance to SMEs during a financial crisis. Nevertheless, they also 
concluded that SMEs access to trade credit and bank credit as external finances differs 
across firms. During the crisis, the access to these external sources of finance changes, 
financially constrained SMEs depend on trade credit and not bank credit. In contrast, 
firms that are not financially constrained are dependent on banks loans but not trade 
credit during the financial crisis. Therefore, this suggests that trade credit is an essential 
instrument that helps some SMEs cope with the financial crisis.  
Blasio (2005) studied Italian manufacturing firms microdata from 1982 to 1999 collected 
from firms accounting data. The study examined the firms’ inventory behaviour to 
identify if bank credit and trade credits are substitute during the tight monetary policy 
period. The study estimated a standard inventory investment model augmented by 
measures of internal resources that include both liquidity and trade credit. The 
dependent variable was the log of first differenced end of period inventories. The 
independent variables included the inventory-sales ratio, firm sales, the ratio of cash 
and marketable securities to total assets, and the ratio of net trade credit to total assets. 
The study concluded that inventory investment of Italian manufacturing firms is 
constrained by the availability of trade credit and that this effect was more than double 
during financial restrictions period. However, the study argued that the magnitude of the 
substitution effect is not sizeable.  
Levchuck (2002) investigated trade credit phenomena in Ukraine. He used micro-level 
financial data for 609 Ukrainian enterprises consisting of balance sheets, financial 
statements, and ownership data over 1999 and 2000. The study analysed the 
determinants of trade credit usage and tested the existence of a substitution effect 
between trade credits and bank credit. The dependent variable was bank credit ratio, 
which is the ratio of short-term firm’s credit to accounts payables, bank credit to sales 
ratio and accounts receivables or accounts payables ratio to sales. Independent 
variables were collateral, sales growth, quick ratio, and net profit. The study found that 
firms’ arrears and financial needs are strongly associated with higher trade credit, while 
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better access to bank lending is associated with less trade credit. This study support 
that bank credit and trade credit are substitutes.   
Özlü and Yalçın (2012) studied trade credit channels in Turkey by using the fixed effect 
model on a panel of firms between 1996 and 2008. The study used three dependent 
variables, namely, trade credits to total liabilities, trade credits to the sum of bank credits 
and trade credits, and bank credits to total liabilities. The independent variables were 
variables representing the monetary policy rate and firm-specific characteristics 
including; overnight interest rate, the size of the firm and short-term bank credit to total 
assets. The study suggested that the composition of external finance varies significantly 
across different firms and different financial conditions. The study concluded that SMEs 
in the manufacturing industry and firms with a low export share are less likely to have 
access to bank finance, especially in tight monetary policy periods; hence, financially 
constrained firms substitute trade credits for bank credit as monetary policy tightens.  
Using the firm level Euro data, Casey and O’Toole (2014) aimed to determine if 
financially constrained SMEs are likely to opt for the alternative external finance such as 
trade credit, informal lending, market financing and state grants etc. The dependent 
variables were binary, requiring the use of a probability choice model. The study used a 
probit approach assuming a normal distribution for the functional form. The independent 
variables were a vector of country controls and vector of firm-level controls to identify 
firm creditworthiness, quality, and risk. The study also included country and firm fixed 
effects as well as time effects in the error term.  The study concluded that there is a 
correlation between credit-rationed firms and trade credit. This correlation rises with the 
size and the age of the firm. The study determined that financially constrained firms are 
inclined to use informal lending but they did not find any evidence supporting that bank-
constrained SMEs apply for, or use “market finance”, instead they are likely to apply for 
“grant finance”. Lastly, they found that firms that are denied funding for working capital 
tend to turn to trade credit, while informal lending tends to act as a substitute for bank 
investment loans.      
The observation that can be made from these studies is that most of them used the 
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firm-specific factors to examine the nexus that trade credit is a substitute to bank credit. 
Most of these studies were conducted using European data, which can suggest that 
there could be continent-specific signals that drove most research conducted using 
European data to conclude that trade credit and bank credit are substitutes. Almost all 
research studies focusing on the vulnerable firms and SMEs were conducted in Europe 
because of a lack of firm-level data on SMEs in the US and other countries (Carbó-
valverde et al., 2016). Hence, it makes sense why most of the studies based in Europe 
supported the substitution hypothesis.  Nevertheless, contrary to this statement, are the 
results of the study conducted by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1997) that used both 
macroeconomic and firm-specific data and were conducted using US data. These 
findings raise an empirical question why trade credit is available when bank credit is 
rationed. Trade credit providers are also likely to be credit constrained and to have high 
cost of funds than banks. Therefore, when banks cannot lend, suppliers should not be 
able to lend either. 
2.6.2. Trade credit and bank credit are complementary 
Empirical evidence consistent with the theories provided by Smith (1987), Mian and 
Smith (1992) and Wilner (2000) that trade credit and bank credit are complements has 
been growing. This nexus appears to be supported by the empirical findings of Garcia-
Appendini (2011) who used the US small non-financial and non-farm businesses’ 2003 
survey data. He concluded that banks were more likely to lend to enterprises that settle 
their accounts payable debts on time. There has also been a growing interest on 
theories provided by Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). 
Atanasova (2012) used a panel of UK companies over 1998 to 2006 using difference 
GMM estimation to determine the choices between bank credit and trade credit. The 
dependent variable was short-term bank loans to sales ratio. Independent variables 
were accounts payable to sales ratio, Interaction dummies to indicate size, age, cash 
ratio, leverage, and collateral of the firm. The study concluded that bank credit and trade 
credit have a complementary relationship when firms are characterised by information 
asymmetry problems and agency cost. This study supports the signalling role of trade 
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credit where trade credit information can be used to signal firms quality to banks. 
Likewise, using the micro-data of Italy SMEs, Agostino and Trivieri (2014) empirically 
investigated the signalling hypothesis formulated on the role of trade credit. The ratio of 
short-term bank credit to total assets was their dependent variable. Among many, the 
independent variables included the ratio of (short- and long-term) trade debt to total 
asset, duration of the relationship with the main bank, the interaction term, and a vector 
including a set of control variables. They concluded that trade credit has an information 
content for banks. These findings are consistent with the theories by Biais and Gollier 
(1997), Burkart, and Ellingsen (2004) theory. 
Also consistent with the Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) 
theory, Gama and Mateus (2010), using SMEs data set of Portuguese and Spanish 
firms, and GMM estimators, concluded that trade credit allows small firms to improve 
their reputation. As trade credit discloses the private information to the bank, banks can 
change their beliefs about default risk related to a particular customer and agree to 
provide bank credit. 
Using the balance sheet data of US small Nonfinancial Firms (SSBF) 1998, Garcia-
Appendini (2007) tested whether suppliers have an information advantage over banks. 
The study was conducted using the probit regression. The study concluded that banks 
provide more credit to opaque firms that have been granted trade credit by suppliers. 
Firms that have been denied trade credit are usually also denied bank credit. This 
indicates the information advantage of suppliers over banks, supporting the signalling 
role of trade credit.  
Saito and Bandeira (2010) used the Brazilian Publicly‐Listed Companies data to 
estimate their model using the indirect least squares method, applied to a simultaneous 
equation system. The independent variables included accounts payable, total debt, 
current assets, total income, firm’s age, sale’s growth, pre-tax earnings, ownership 
share of principal owner, firm size, depreciable assets, the dummies proxies for the use 
of capital lease and use of loans from stockholders, and the dummies for industry 
34 
 
control.  The study found empirical evidence that listed firms do use bank credit and 
trade credit as two complementary sources of financing. This is in line with recent 
theoretical studies (Biais & Gollier, 1997). Furthermore, by using a sample of 263 
publicly listed companies from 2006, the study concluded that trade credit may be used 
as a sign of the firm’s quality, hence can be used as a way to facilitate access to bank 
credit. 
Aktas de Bodt, Lobez, and Statnik (2010) studied the US listed firms between 1992 and 
2007 using information from Compustat’s database and the four-factor model. The 
study derived a theoretical model to estimate the relationship between the quality of the 
firm’s investment decisions and firms’ intensity of trade credit. The study used two 
different dependent variables. The first was the percentage change in Z-score between 
two successive years and the second one was the firm’s Jensen’s alpha. Their 
independent variables were working capital divided by total assets, retained earnings 
divided by total assets, earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets, the 
ratio of market value of equity to the book value of total debts, and total sales divided by 
total assets. Trade credit was measured by the ratio of accounts payable to total assets. 
The study included three additional firm-specific control variables: debt ratio, cash ratio, 
and finished goods inventories ratio. The study concluded that the Z-score and long-run 
abnormal returns serve as proxies for the quality of firm investment projects. 
Pike, Cheng, Cravens, and Lamminmaki (2005) studied 700 large firms in the US, UK, 
and Australia, using the Logit model to explored trade credit terms with the aim to 
determine if trade credit reduces information asymmetries and discriminatory pricing 
hypotheses. The conclusion of the study supports both theories of reducing information 
asymmetries and discriminatory pricing. 
Psillaki and Eleftheriou (2014) using a sample of French SMEs from four industries 
investigated the impact of the global financial crisis on the allocation of credit to SMEs 
and the relationship between bank credit and trade credit. The study used the fixed 
effects panel regression model. The dependent variable that they used was the flow in 
bank borrowing repayable within one year. The independent variables were the flow of 
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trade credit payable, the gross fixed over total assets ratio and the return on total 
assets. The study concluded that trade credit for small firms during tight monetary policy 
periods are a complement rather than a substitute to bank credit. This study empirically 
supports the redistribution theory of trade credit. 
Ziane (2004) used a sample of French SMEs to examine the determinants that affect 
the use of trade credit using the OLS estimates and logit estimates. In this study, both 
the transaction and financing components were included in the model. The study 
modelled the transaction component as a function of transaction costs, and the financial 
components as a function of bank credit rationing and financing risk. The dependent 
variable was the trade credit demand realised by firms. The study concluded that a 
higher volume of transactions, and greater financial and business risk, are associated 
with a greater demand for trade credit, which suggest that trade and bank credit are 
complementary. 
Using firm-level data for a group of six emerging economies, Love et al. (2005) 
investigated the effect of financial crises on trade credit. They concluded that financially 
constrained firms are more likely to reduce the provision of trade credit to their 
customers in the event of a financial crisis. Their findings also indicate that firms that are 
highly dependent on short-term bank credit are the main suppliers of trade credit during 
non-crisis periods. During the crisis, they observe a significant positive relationship 
between bank credit and the provision of trade credit. They concluded that firms that are 
successful in securing bank finance ‘redistribute’ it to firms unable to do so in the form of 
trade credit. This mean that financially strong firms get credit from banks, and 
redistribute the credit in a form of trade credit to financially constrained firms.  
The main shortcomings of majority of the studies based on Biais and Gollier (1997) and 
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) theories is that, they fail to explain why a banks as 
specialist in the evaluation of borrowers creditworthiness, would have less information 
than trade credit providers or suppliers. Moreover, whilst it is generally accepted that 
suppliers have information than banks, why the theories do not explain why suppliers 
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regularly lend inputs, but only very rarely lend cash. Nevertheless, it can be observed 
from these empirical findings that complementary hypothesis comes in different forms, 
either in the form of redistribution or revealing trade credit private information to the 
bank. Consequently, banks may update or change their beliefs about customer default 
risk and extend the bank credit.  
2.6.3. Mixed results 
From the theoretical point of view, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) took a neutral view. The 
hypothetical model entailed that it is possible for bank credit and trade credit to serve as 
either complements or substitutes based on two fundamental assumptions. Suppliers 
can monitor their customer better than banks, and this may grant them an advantage 
when compared to the banks in input transactions as they are directly involved. Hence, 
banks and suppliers exposure to the moral hazard is not the same because inputs are 
less liquid, and thus less easily diverted than cash (Agostino and Trivieri, 2014). If 
banks recognise that the relative illiquidity of inputs makes investing preferable, banks 
are inclined to lend thus the two sources of financing are complements (Agostino and 
Trivieri, 2014). According to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), this is the case only when the 
firms’ aggregate debt capacity limits investments, thus when this is not the case, bank 
credit and trade credit are substitutes.  
Empirically taking the neutral view, Yang (2011) using the data from US manufacturing 
firms built an inventory model where bank credit and trade credit coexist and used the 
GMM to estimate the structural parameters. The author indicated that substitute effects 
and complementary effects are not “mutually exclusive” but these effects interact 
together. Furthermore, the study indicated that the complementary effect dominates the 
substitute effect, depending on the credit market conditions. During tighter monetary 
policy period, trade credit becomes relatively cheaper and tends to substitute bank 
credit mostly, and during the loose monetary policy, the complementary effect tends to 
prevail.  
Alatalo (2010) analysed 1,084 manufacturing firms in the UK to examine the patterns of 
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trade credit during a financial crisis using the panel data technique. The study also 
aimed to determine whether firms’ susceptibility to the financial crisis affects the 
potential change between different sources of finance. The dependent variables used 
were accounts payable, accounts receivable and net trade credit while the independent 
variables were cash flows/assets, cash balance/assets, the logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE) and logarithmic sales growth. The study indicated a robust evidence of a 
decreasing use of trade credit in 2008 and some limited evidence of a decrease already 
in 2007. Hence, the study indicated no support for the theory of trade credit channel.  
The author found a positive relationship between trade credit and firm size in 2008, but 
the scale of the effect was small compared to the overall negative effect of the year. 
Larger firms decreased the provision of trade credit less than smaller firms, but the 
study found that size was positively related to change in obtaining trade credit during 
both 2007 and 2008. 
Zhang (2011) using the fixed effects models studied a sample of publicly traded firms in 
Thailand during the period 1994 to 2005. The study aimed to determine, whether 
enterprises use less trade credit in the context of better information sharing if financially 
constrained enterprises are more dependent on trade credit and if the improvement in 
information sharing reduces trade credit sensitivity to use firm-specific factors.  The 
study used trade credit as a dependent variable. The independent variables were 
financial constraint dummy, information sharing dummy, cash ratio, cash flow, leverage, 
and interest ratio. Zhang obtained three different findings. The study found that Thai 
firms became less dependent on trade credit as a result of better information sharing, 
financially constrained enterprises redistributed more funds in a form of trade credit; and 
the correlation between trade credit and firm-specific factors such as liquidity, tangible 
assets, and firm size weakened as information sharing improved. These results are 
consistent with the view that better exchange of information facilitates credit allocation. 
The study also supported that bank credit substitute’s trade credit.  
Lin and Chou (2014) used the quarterly data of 1213 Chinese firms from the first quarter 
of 2006 to 2012 to examine the relationship between bank credit and trade credit 
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especially during the 2008-2009 global financial crises. Using the fixed effect model, the 
study used accounts receivable, account payable and net trade credit as dependent 
variables, bank credit, period dummies, and other control variables such as sales, total 
assets, and cost of sales, inventory and cash flow as the independent variables. They 
found a significant positive relationship between accounts receivables and bank credit 
and a significant negative relationship between accounts payable and bank credit. This 
confirmed both the complementary and substitute relationship.  
Engemann, Eck, and Schnitzer, (2014) used data provided by the Economic and 
Business Data for years 1994–2009. The model was estimated using the two-step GMM 
estimator for panel data method. The dependent variable was bank credit. Trade credit 
was the independent variable of the study’s interest. They included a financial constraint 
dummy variable and an interaction term of trade credit received. The study concluded 
that in general, trade credit and bank credit are substitutes. In addition, the study found 
that for financially constrained exporters the substitution effect is weak. Their findings 
were also consistent with the positive signalling effect of trade credit on bank credit. The 
study attributed this finding to trade credit’s ability to reduce the uncertainty that makes 
banks more willing to extend additional bank credit to financially constrained exporters.  
Cai, Chen, and Xiao (2014) investigated a panel of 674 firms in China over the period 
2001–2007. The study employed the simultaneous equation modelling with panel data 
approach generalised two-stage least squares (G2SLS) and random effects regression. 
The independent variable was bank credit, and the independent variables were trade 
credit, solvency ratio, inventory, sales, and cash. The study proved that the two credits 
are complementary if the retailer’s internal capital is low but become substitutable as the 
internal capital grows. 
2.6.4. Empirical evidence based in Africa 
In Africa, there are a few empirical studies on trade credit. Most of the African-based 
studies did not focus their attention on whether trade credit is a substitute or 
complement to bank credit, but looks at access to trade credit by different ethnic groups 
and other attributes. 
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Looking at productivity gains from trade credit, Fisman (2001) used basic hypothesis 
from a cross-section of African firms (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe), and show that trade credit is positively related to capacity utilisation. This 
suggests that there may be significant productivity gains from an increase in the 
availability of trade credit. As a result, Fisman (2001) suggested that steps should be 
taken to increase credit information for suppliers and improved contract enforcement for 
credit liabilities.  
Fisman and Raturi (2000) investigated the impact of competition on the relationship 
development using trade credit data from five African countries (Ghana, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). They utilised two different models; random effects 
logit, and conditional fixed effects logit model, and they showed that competition among 
firms has a positive effect on incentives to establish long-term cooperative relationships. 
For an average firm, the probability of obtaining trade credit increases from 40% to 60% 
after switching from a monopolistic market to a competitive supplier market. A high level 
of competition makes switching suppliers very costly and hence promotes ‘lock-in’ 
between suppliers and customers.  
Fafchamps (1996) studied Zimbabwe manufacturing firms using a case study and panel 
survey. The study concluded that black entrepreneurs face the difficulty in distinguishing 
themselves from many firms that are financially constrained and short-lived in 
Zimbabwe. These entrepreneurs also lack business contacts. Hence, they are 
disadvantaged and unable to access trade credit. Similar to the study that Fafchamps 
did in Zimbabwe, using RPED data, Fafchamps et al. (1994) identified that the use of 
trade credit in Kenya increases with firm size. Their evidence suggests that micro 
enterprises are rationed out of the trade credit market and that small firms in Kenya are 
not heavy users of trade credit. Ethnicity is also found to be a major factor, with black-
owned enterprises receiving the least trade credit. On the other hand, Bade and 
Chifamba (1994) conclude that in the case of Zimbabwe, firms are more likely to secure 
trade credit if they regularly purchase in bulk, if they are more profitable, and if they 
have an overdraft facility. Fafchamps (1997) found that Zimbabwean firms use a 
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combination of statistical discrimination, formal screening, reputation, and acquaintance 
when extending trade credit. Established firms use credit application forms, bank, and 
trade references to select qualifying recipients of trade credit. The study found that 
reputation and relationships are the most important instruments for accessing trade 
credit and enforcing payment. 
Fafchamps (1999) concludes that network effects are significant determinants of access 
to trade credit by black-owned and female-headed enterprises in Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
He found that ethnicity and gender have minimal effects on access to bank credit. 
However, these attributes have a strong negative impact on the ability of entrepreneurs 
to access trade credit. His results indicate that blacks and women are penalised for their 
lack of connections with the business community, and their inability to signal their 
creditworthiness among a pool of inexperienced micro enterprises. 
Hermes, Kihanga, Lensink, and Lutz (2011) studied the impact of trade credit on 
customer switching behaviour in Tanzania using primary survey data. They concluded 
that there is a negative relationship between trade credit and customer switching 
behaviour. This entails that trade credit acts as a switching barrier. Hence, retailers 
hesitate to shift to another supplier if they are dependent on trade credit as a source of 
external finance. Measures of customer switching were their dependent variable, and 
they measure it with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a retailer stopped buying on a 
regular basis from the supplier, and the dummy variable equals 0 if the retailer bought 
from the same supplier over the entire two-year during their period of study. 
Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010) studied SMEs in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa 
to identify the determinants of access to trade credit by new firms using logistic 
regression. The study used the primary research and collection of data using a survey. 
Data were collected from 417 respondents. The study concluded that business size, 
business plan availability, competency of management, insurance, incorporation, 
location, previous relationship, and trade associations are the determinants of access to 
trade credit by SMEs in South Africa. 
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Otto’s (2014) study established whether trade credit is being mismanaged by SMEs in 
South Africa. The study used questionnaire administered to 352 SME respondents. 
Based on the statistical techniques such as descriptive statistics, frequencies, matched 
samples t-test and the McNemar test, the study recommended that SMEs should 
improve the management of trade credit. 
Fakoti (2014) investigated the perception that trade creditors’ has on new small 
businesses regarding risk and benefit. The study used a survey based on self-
administered questionnaires. The study provided some descriptive statistics to analyse 
the data. It was concluded that trade creditors perceive new small businesses as risky 
but beneficial to their business. These findings suggested that lack of access to trade 
credit by new small businesses is caused by the perception of risk but not the lack of 
interest.   
Fakoti (2012) investigated whether the ethical challenges faced by new SMEs are a 
constraint on the availability of trade credit as a major source of external debt finance. 
The study used survey data collected through self-administered questionnaires. Data 
analysis included descriptive statistics, Chi-square goodness of fit test, t-test, and 
ANOVA. The study concluded that ethical challenges faced by new SMEs impact on the 
availability of trade credit and recommended improvement in the ethical behaviour of 
new SMEs. 
Kwenda and Holden (2014) explored a balanced panel data that was collected for 92 
listed enterprises in South Africa over 2001 to 2010. The study employed the GMM 
estimation method as a way control for any potential endogeneity problems and 
unobservable heterogeneity. The study examined the factors that influence the use of 
trade credit for enterprises listed on the JSE. The study concluded that enterprises have 
a targeted level of trade credit (account payable). The study also found that enterprises’ 
internally generated resources, investment opportunities, and short-term financial debt 
play a significant role in their decisions to use trade credit as a source of finance for the 
listed enterprises. Finally, the study recommended that firms should focus on 
relationships with their suppliers, as their trade credit is a vital source of funding. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
Although conclusions must be described with caution, from the theoretical evidence it is 
shown that trade credit plays a role in financial intermediation. One can see that trade 
credit plays a critical role either motivated by the transactional or the financial motive, 
and either as a substitute or complement to bank credit. The transaction motives were 
explained from theory provided by Ferris (1981). The theory entails that trade credit 
plays a role in enabling less frequent payments, which reduces transaction cost. Trade 
credit could be utilised to gain a mean to price discriminate between different 
customers. Another motive for trade credit is reducing informational asymmetries and 
preserving the equity stake invested on the customer. The financing motives were 
explained from theory provided by Mian and Smith (1992). Furthermore, Jain (2001) 
posits that suppliers have the greater advantage in monitoring customers, the ability of 
suppliers to control the customer, and higher recouping value of the collateral. 
The theories and empirical evidence indicate that trade credit plays a role in financial 
intermediation, but a conclusion cannot be drawn from the literature review on whether 
it plays a substitutive role or complementary role. Most of the earliest theories and 
empirical evidence supported the substitution role, while recently there has been 
increasing support for the complementary role.  The complementary can be in a form of 
redistributive hypothesis or signalling role of trade credit.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIAL SECTOR AND TRADE CREDIT 
MARKET 
3.0. Introduction  
South Africa has experienced significant positive changes in the financial sector over 
the past 20 years through legislation, consolidation, and technology. South Africa in now 
a stable democratic and legislative environment, which has become a strategic gateway 
to Africa (Djoumessi, 2009). Numerous foreign banks established branches or 
representative offices in South Africa and others acquired stakes in South Africa’s major 
banks. The legislation, products, technology, and the number of participants in the 
financial sector increased, and this enhanced the level of competition. Currently, the 
banking industry in South Africa consists of 17 commercial banks, two mutual banks, 12 
foreign banks branches, and 41 foreign banks with local representative headquarters 
(BASA, 2015).  
South Africa banking system is considered to be well-developed and regulated and can 
be compared favourably with many industrialised countries. South Africa banking 
system was ranked third out of 148 countries in the 2013/14 World Economic Forum 
(WEF) Competitiveness Survey (BASA, 2014)3. As already stated, this is not across all 
segments; the formal sector can easily access bank credit, while the informal sector 
struggles to access bank credit (Turner et al., 2008). One of the contributions to this is 
that it has become more common in the financial sector to rely on automated 
underwriting; as such, lenders have moved into relying on standardised data when 
granting credit. Thus, the financial institutions’ default assumption is that insufficient 
information is associated with high credit risk. Owing to insufficient credit information, 
lenders assume that many entrepreneurs in South Africa are too risky for credit (Turner 
et al., 2008). 
                                                          
3 BASA, SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING SECTOR OVERVIEW http://www.banking.org.za/docs/default-
source/publication/banking-sector-overview.pdf?sfvrsn=6 Accessed 25 October 2015 
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Many countries collect trade credit data for commercial lending, and the formal 
economy in South Africa collects trade credit data (Turner et al., 2008). It is also 
common in many countries to collect non-financial payment data when standard credit 
information is unavailable. This suggests that a structure for sharing credit information 
and credit reporting can increase access to credit. However, South Africa rarely collect 
this kind of information (Turner et al., 2008).  Nevertheless, the ability to get funding is 
critical to any business. Access to credit is vital to ensure enterprises’ growth and 
sustainability, which subsequently enhances the country’s growth, employment, and the 
asset formation. 
 3.1. Historical overview 
A number of commercial banks dominated South Africa’s financial industry before the 
1950s. By then, commercial banks used to provide only a certain numbers of financial 
services. The industry did not provide some crucial services such as credit card facilities 
personal loans, and property leasing. This has since improved subsequent to the 
development of new institutions such as merchant banks and discount houses, etc.  
The policy framework during the pre-apartheid period was not conducive for growth 
(Chauhan and Sibanda, 2012). Between 1961 and 1993, South Africa strengthened the 
exchange controls through the Exchange Control Regulations Act to avoid the 
weakening capital account (Chauhan and Sibanda, 2012). To facilitate the exchange 
controls, South Africa adopted a dual exchange rate and introduced the financial rand 
for non-resident transactions (Chauhan and Sibanda, 2012). However, the exchange 
controls had adverse effects on the economy by distorting the allocative efficiency of the 
market economy.  
Furthermore, before 1994, the South African financial sector confronted many 
challenges emanating from apartheid government. These include among others, 
international sanctions and political isolation. As a result of international sanctions, the 
country was hit by a debt crisis in 1985. The debt crisis emanated from the decision 
when a group of international banks withdrew substantial credit lines. Furthermore, as a 
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result of sanctions, many foreign corporations decided to sell their South African 
investments (Djoumessi, 2009). 
Investors’ perception was only altered owing to political liberalisation and the successful 
transition to democracy in April 1994 and South Africa re-opened itself to international 
financial markets. The aim of liberalisation was to attract foreign investments, support a 
sounder market, and enhance acceptance and participation in the world economy; 
contributing to economic growth. South Africa lifted the “stand-still” arrangement with 
foreign creditor banks. Thereafter the short-term credit was made available to South 
African banks, and many foreign banks returned into the South African market 
(Djoumessi, 2009).  
For South Africa to accomplish these milestones there had to be policy reform to 
maintain and develop a stable and healthy financial sector. This consisted of improving 
economic policies and amending the regulatory and legal framework. Table 1 illustrates 
some of the policy frameworks that were adjusted and improved. It can be deduced 
from Table 1 that the policies before 1994 were restrictive. Starting from 1995, the 
government relaxed and abolished some of the restrictive policies.  
For instance, the government gradually started to phase out exchange controls in 1993 
subsequent to positive political developments. The major step towards relaxing the 
exchange controls took place in 1995 when the dual exchange rate system was brought 
to an end. Thereafter, the government gradually relaxed other exchange control 
measures that facilitated easier cross-border movements in capital. According to Gidlow 
(1995), these efforts helped to minimise the problem of illiquidity and increased 
competition, which reduced transaction costs and improved economic efficiency. 
However, exchange controls over residents and emigrants were, maintained. Significant 
relaxation over residents was only effected in 1997. 
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Table 1: Policy framework pre and post-apartheid 
Date Description 
Prior to the 1980s 
-  Period of export subsidies, Import control, high import duties. 
-  Credit ceilings and the deposit interest rates were controlled.  
1980  - Abolished deposit interest rate controls and credit ceilings.  
-  Abolished the 7,5 per cent surcharge on imports. 
1985 
-  Reintroduced the surcharge on imports.  
- Capital controls tightened 
1986 
- Money supply targeting introduced.  
1995  
 
- Introduced reduction in import duties  
- Abolished Remaining surcharge on imports. 
- Exchange controls on non-residents eliminated  
1997 
 
- SA stopped requiring gold producers to market their gold through SARB.  
-  Foreign banks allowed opening branches in South Africa. 
-  Controls on residents relaxed 
1998 
- Announcement of inflation targeting and  
- Money supply guidelines 
2000 
- Formal inflation targeting introduced. 
2003 
- Became a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 4 
2005 
- Introduction of the National Credit Act (NCA)  
2008 
- Upgrade to Basel II.  
2011 
- Upgrade to Basel III.  
- Draft Credit Ratings Services Bill to provide for the conditions for the issuance of credit ratings 
- Announcement of Twin-peak approach 
Source: Cross (2003) in Chauhan and Sibanda (2012) 
South Africa now has a sound regulatory and legal framework. The regulations are tight, 
and they protected the financial sector from the financial crisis in 2008. The financial 
sector is sophisticated, and it boasts domestic and foreign institutions providing a full 
range of services (Djoumessi, 2009). The South African banking system as a major part 
of the financial sector is sound and developed and well regulated. It consists of a central 
                                                          
4 This was in order to combat money laundering. 
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bank, that is, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), as well as a few large 
commercial and mutual banks, investment institutions, and a number of smaller banks.  
The legislation that governs the banks are the Banks Act 1990 and the Mutual Banks 
Act 1993. SARB enforces these pieces of legislations in the office headed by the 
Registrar of Banks. SARB is responsible for registration of institutions such as banks 
and mutual banks in addition to administering the requirements of the Banks and Mutual 
Banks Acts.  
The Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) is an industry representative for all 
banks in South Africa. Its mandate is to represent the sector and represent the industry 
through lobbying, engagement with stakeholders and political influence (BASA). 
The Financial Service Board (FSB), on the other hand, oversees the non-banking 
sector. FSB is an independent body that is responsible for the regulation of financial 
markets and institutions, including brokers, fund managers, and insurers.  
The FSB administers the following legislations:   
1. Credit Rating Services Act (Act 24 of 2012); 
2. Collective Investment Schemes Control Act (Act 45 of 2002); 
3. Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act (Act 28 of 2001); 
4. Financial, Advisory and Intermediaries Services Act (FAIS Act) (Act 37 of 2002); 
5. Financial Markets Act (Act 19 of 2012); 
6. Financial Services Board Act (Act 97 of 1990); 
7. Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act (Act 37 of 2004); 
8. Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act (Act 8 of 1993); 
9. Friendly Societies Act (Act 25 of 1956); 
10. Inspection of Financial Institutions Act (Act 80 of 1998); 
11. Long-term Insurance Act (Act 52 of 1998);  
12. Pension Funds Act, 24 (Act 24 of 1956); and  
13. Short-term Insurance Act (Act 53 of 1998) (FSB). 
 
The National Credit Regulator (NCR) is an institution that is responsible for the 
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regulation of the South Africa credit industry. NCR is responsible for the registration of 
credit bureaus, credit providers, and debt counsellors. Its mandate is to administer 
National Credit Act (NCA) and ensure that the industry complies with the act, and 
develop an accessible credit market to promote the needs of economically marginalised 
South Africans. 
Lastly, the Credit Bureau Association (CBA) is an association that endorses fair and 
equitable services, representing nine out of the 14 registered credit bureaus. It ensures 
that credit bureaus deal with information confidentially and accurately, provide 
relevance, and utilise data in accordance with international best practice. By facilitating 
a reasonable practice within the credit bureau industry; CBA aims to provide a 
framework for a sustainable and well-functioning credit information system. 
3.2. Lending condition in South Africa 
In South Africa, the total credit to the economy increased since 1994. Between 1994 
and 2001, domestic credit to the private sector increased from 111% to 138% of GDP, 
GDP (SARB). This reflects that the banking system has increased credit access and 
indicates new entrants to the banking sector. In addition, bank deposits rose from 14% 
in 1993 to 90% in 2012 (SARB). This indicates that the financial size and depth as 
measured by the bank deposits have been stable. 
 
The number of commercial banks branches per 100 000 adults increased from 2004 to 
2006 (SARB). The same applies to the number of commercial bank branches per 1000 
square metres. On average, the number of commercial bank branches per 100 000 
adults increased from 4.74 in 2004 to 10.24 in 2012 and the number of commercial 
bank branches per 1000 square metres increased from 1.26 in 2004 to 3.05 in 2012 
(SARB). The assets of the banking institutions as a percentage of GDP increased 
steadily from 22% in 1994 to 129% in 2012 (SARB). This indicates that the breadth of 
the financial sector increased significantly.  
After the introduction of the NCA in 2007, there was a drop in credit granted to the 
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South African market (NCR). However, in 2009, there was a turning point. The credit 
granted started to grow and in 2012 went back to the level of the end of Quarter 4 in 
2007 (NCR). The size of the credit market at the end of 2011 was R1.3 trillion (NCR). 
Banks are the prominent credit providers. Nevertheless, while the South African banking 
sector is one of the best in the world, the population remains significantly under-banked. 
The rejection rate of small firms that apply for bank-sponsored schemes is high and 
even registered micro enterprises are least likely to have access to credit.  
Underhill Corporate Solutions conducted a study for the NCR in 2011 to examine if 
there is SME financing gap in South Africa. A “financing gap” refers to a proportion of 
economically significant SMEs that cannot obtain credit. They estimated the total 
financing gap at around 45-48% of all SMEs in South Africa.  
In aggregate, when looking at all the credit provided to customers, the total number of 
credit agreements entered into was 4.51 million for the quarter ended June 2016 based 
on the NCR Consumer Credit Market Quarterly Report5. Out of the 4.51 million, banks 
accounted for 77.45% of the total value of credit granted. This is indicated in Figure 1.  
The non-bank vehicle financiers extended 9.34%, retailers 2.74%, and other credit 
providers 10.47% of the 4.51 million.  
 
                                                          
5 See https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/CCMR/CCMR%20June%202016.pdf accessed 27 January 2017 
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Figure 1: Credit granted per industry as at June 2016 
Source: NCR 2016 
The number of application to these industries was 9.9 million, of which 5.3 million or 
54.44% was rejected as indicated in Figure 2, and only 46% was accepted. This 
indicates that the credit rejection level is very high. The number of applications that are 
rejected is above the number of accepted applications.  
 
Figure 2: Number of application and rejection as at June 2016 
Source: NCR 2016 
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Figure 3 indicates the composition of the credit provided. Most of the credit was secured 
credit (33.19%), followed by mortgages agreement (33.11%) and credit facilities 
(11.13%). These types of credit are defined as follow:  
Credit facilities - An agreement that meets all the criteria as set out in section 8 (3) of the NCA. 
The values (rand value and number of accounts) reported for “credit facility” includes both new 
credit facilities and limit increases for existing credit facility agreements. These values represent 
the potential exposure of the credit providers and not the actual usage/consumption by 
consumers. This does not apply to the gross value of the debtors book values where actual credit 
usage by consumers is reported.  
Mortgage agreements - An agreement that is secured by a pledge of immovable property. 
Secured credit transactions- Credit transactions that do not fall within the other named categories 
in the NCA. This category includes pension-backed loans, insurance-backed loans, retail furniture 
accounts and motor vehicle accounts.  
Short-term credit transactions - An agreement that meets all the criteria as set out in section 39 
(2) of the National Credit Regulations. This includes amounts not exceeding R8 000 and 
repayable within 6 months.  
Unsecured credit transactions - An agreement that meets all the criteria as set out in section 
39 (3) of the National Credit Regulations, where the loan or credit is not secured by any pledge or 
personal security.  
Developmental credit transactions - Developmental credit agreement means a credit 
agreement that satisfies the criteria set out in Section 10; This includes educational loan; small 
business; the acquisition, rehabilitation, building or expansion of low-income housing; or any 
other purpose in terms of subsection (2) (a). 
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Figure 3: Credit granted type as at June 2016 
Source: NCA 2016 
Moreover, Driver, Wood, Segal, and Herrington (2001) reported that financial institutions 
in South Africa mainly deal with large corporations that undertake large projects.  Driver 
et al. (2001) further claim that banks do not support enterprises through a process and 
would rather lend more to one customer than lend insignificant amounts to many 
customers because it is costly and involves too much paperwork for the banks.  
3.3. Information provision from Credit Bureaus  
Credit bureaus play a major role in South Africa. Individuals and consumers’ 
creditworthiness is measured based on information provided by credit bureaus. The 
credit bureaus do not have the power to decide on the granting of credit, but they collect 
information that indicates credit habits and history and used to create a credit score. 
Creditors, such as banks use this information to decide whether to grant credit. Hence, 
credit bureaus prevent adverse selection and moral hazard because credit decisions 
are made with the best possible information. 
 There are 14 registered credit bureaus in South Africa. According to the second quarter 
Credit Bureau Monitor 2016, credit bureaus hold records for 24.08 million credit-active 
consumers. Consumers classified in good standing were 14.41 million consumers in 
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2016. The number of consumers with impaired records was 9.67 million in 2016.  The 
number of accounts was 84.56 million, and out of this, the number of impaired accounts 
was 20.24 million. About 434 million enquiries were made on consumer credit records. 
Enquiries that were initiated by consumers accounted for 16.48 million of all enquiries 
and enquiries from banks and other financial institutions accounted for 67.5%, enquiries 
from telecommunication providers accounted for 8.4% and enquiries from retailers 
accounted for 6.0%.  
South Africa has a sophisticated credit bureau system. South Africa is ranked 62 in the 
world in terms of ease of getting access to credit based on the strength of legal rights 
and the depth of credit information (World Bank, 2017). On a scale of 0-8, the depth of 
credit information is seven, indicating high scope and accessibility of credit information 
distributed by credit bureaus in South Africa. The strength of legal right index is 5 and 
can be considered as a moderate level. This indicates that the extent to which 
bankruptcy laws and pledge of collateral are able to protect borrowers and lenders 
rights and therefore facilitate lending is slightly reasonable in South Africa.  
Nevertheless, some enterprises cannot access credit due to lack of information. 
According to the CBA6, this is due to challenges such as difficulties in collecting data 
from the large less formal economy; lack of sharing of trade credit data; lack of sharing 
of payment performance information on personal loans used for commercial purposes; 
and lack of sharing of non-financial data such as utility data in commercial environment. 
3.4. Trade credit trend in South Africa 
Trade credit is one of the major sources of finance in modern economies. Trade credit 
estimated by accounts payable was approximately 15% of total assets in 1991 for listed 
US firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This compares to records reported in, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Aktas, et al. (2010) report that 
                                                          
6 See 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/sme_development/sumit/The%20importance%20of%20the%20credit%20bureau%20to
%20the%20development%20and%20gro.pdf accessed 27 January 2017. 
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trade credit that finances asset of US-listed firms between 1992 and 2007 amounted to 
close to 10%. This corroborates the findings of this current study. In South Africa, over 
2007 to 2015, suppliers financed almost 10% of the total assets of the sample 
enterprises.  
 
Nonetheless, in South Africa, examinations of access to credit seldom take into account 
access to and use of trade credit. The most predominant source of credit used by SMEs 
in most if not all economies is trade credit. Therefore, trade credits’ information can 
serve as an important basis for evaluating risk in small-business loans. Trade credit 
constitutes the most of SMEs credit files in South Africa. It accounts for at least R24 
billion every month in total outstanding credits (Turner et al., 2008). In addition to a 
signalling role of trade credit to help banks with a basis to measure risk, trade credit 
data is considered as a tool to help other trade credit suppliers with an opportunity to 
examine the risk associated with their customer (Turner et al., 2008). It is also possible 
to use trade credit data as a measure of the potential growth and current capacity of 
businesses because the trade credit data indicates amounts outstanding over time 
(Turner et al., 2008). 
According to Turner et al (2008), it is not easy to collect trade credit as compared to 
bank loan data. The reason behind this difficulty although not clear, could be associated 
with the specifics of the market and the industry experience with reporting trade credit 
data (Turner et al., 2008). One reason reported in the literature is the fact that trade 
credit data come from several sources, and often the sources are not equipped to report 
on their customers and suppliers unless if it is a large firm (Turner et al., 2008). 
Table 2 indicates investment and working capital financed by different sources of 
finance. Close to 10% total assets are financed by trade credit, 29% of current assets is 
financed by trade credit in South Africa, and contribute 38% of current liabilities. This 
entails that trade credit is important and is used mostly to finance working capital.  
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Table 2: Trade credit contribution and financing 
Year Trade credit/Total assets Trade credit/Current assets Trade credit/Current liabilities 
2007 9.72% 27.69% 32.70% 
2008 10.67% 29.14% 35.00% 
2009 9.95% 29.95% 35.42% 
2010 9.21% 26.26% 34.63% 
2011 10.12% 31.39% 40.86% 
2012 10.18% 30.38% 40.16% 
2013 9.74% 30.00% 40.11% 
2014 9.59% 30.22% 39.12% 
2015 9.26% 29.95% 39.76% 
Average 9.83% 29.44% 37.53% 
Source: Author’s own computation based on the Bureau Van Dijk (2007-2015) database 
3.5. Relationship between trade credit and bank credit 
The theories posit that trade credit and bank credit can either be complements or 
substitutes. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between trade credit and bank credit in 
South Africa between 2007 and 2015. Figure 4 indicates total trade credit and bank 
credit amounts. Creditors represent accounts payable while debtors represent accounts 
receivable and bank credit is represented by loans. In Figure 5, Tpay (trade credit) is 
measured by accounts payable (creditors) divided by total assets, Tcrec is measured by 
accounts receivable (debtors) divided by total assets, Tcnet is measured by accounts 
receivable minus accounts payable divided by total assets, and bank credit is measured 
by bank credit divided by total assets.  
 
In Figure 4, the relationship between trade credit and bank credit is clearly positive 
throughout the period, with some indication of lagged positive relationship between 
trade payable (creditors) and bank credit (loans).  It is interesting that creditors and 
debtors are also moving in the same direction. This is an indication that when 
enterprises buy more and delay their payments to their creditors, they are also able to 
sell more on credit to their debtors.  
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Figure 5 also indicates a positive relationship between trade credit and bank credit (but 
not with all trade credit indicators). The relationship between Tpay and Bkloan is 
positive throughout the period. However, there are instances where Tpay and Bkloan 
indicate a lagged positive relationship for instance in 2011 and 2012. Tcnet and Bkloan 
indicate a positive relationship, but it was negative between 2007 and 2008.  
Unlike in the study by Lin and Chou (2014), there is no clear or constant relationship 
during the financial crisis in 2008-2009. Lin and Chou’s (2014) study on China indicated 
a negative relationship during the financial crisis, which supported the theory first 
developed by Meltzer (1960). Throughout the other periods under Lin and Chou (2014) 
study, the relationship between trade credit and bank credit was positive, indicating a 
complementary relationship.  
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Figure 4: Total loans and trade credit 
Source: Author’s own computation based on the Bureau Van Dijk (2007-2015) database 
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Figure 5: Trade credit/total assets compared to bank credit 
Source: Author’s own computation based on the Bureau Van Dijk (2007-2015) database 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was determined that regardless of the level of development in the 
financial sector, South Africa’s financial sector has not met the financial demand of 
enterprises considered to be of greater credit risk and lack collateral and financial 
business expertise. The study utilised various quantitative indicators of the financial 
sector and trade credit use. The analysis suggested that South African financial sector 
is well-developed.  
To determine the role that trade credit can play to ensure access to the most efficient 
bank financing, trade credit was compared to bank credit. The figures indicated a 
positive relationship between trade credit and bank credit, which entails that trade 
credit, has information content that can be used by the banks to analyse credit risk and 
decrease the information asymmetry. The next chapters provide methodology and 
empirical evidence to determine if this relationship is statistically significant. 
58 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.0. Introduction  
Having established in the previous chapters that trade credit plays a critical role in 
financial intermediation; this chapter now empirically tests the nature of relationship or 
association between these two variables in South Africa. Internationally, economists 
have long debated the practical importance and the role that trade credit plays. Some 
argue that it is a substitute to bank credit, while some are claiming that it is a 
complement and some providing mixed results (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Jain, 2001; 
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Garcia-Appendini, 2011). The challenges remain that in 
South Africa, the literature discusses the importance of this nexus, but there are no 
empirical studies available yet to prove these theories in the South African context. Only 
a few did carry out research on trade credit, but with different objectives (Olawale and 
Akinwumi, 2010; Kohler and Saville, 2011; Kwenda and Holden, 2014, Otto, 2014). 
Among the studies that have been carried out in South Africa, only Kwenda and 
Holden’s (2014) study is marginally closer to the objective of this study. Kwenda and 
Holden (2014) dealt with determinants of trade credit among South African listed firms, 
Kohler and Saville (2011) dealt with the determinants of access to trade credit by new 
SMEs in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa and Olawale, and Akinwumi (2010) 
focused on trade finance. 
This study used the panel-data approach to explore the relationship between trade 
credit and bank credit using random and fixed effects models. For instance, Lin and 
Chou (2014) and Tsuruta (2008) used these methods. The issues relating to the choice 
between random and fixed effects model is also discussed. An empirical illustration is 
provided in Chapter 57.  Instrumental variables procedures or GMM provide interesting 
alternatives where the introduction of lagged dependent variable does not complicate 
                                                          
7 the appropriate model will depend on the results of the Hausman test 
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consistent estimation. In addition, to identify if the results are robust to the estimation 
technique used the study also uses the Tobit model. These methods are used by many 
studies (Agostino and Trivieri (2014) and Gama and Mateus (2010), justifications for 
using these models are explained later in this chapter. 
4.1. Methodology  
4.1.1. Model specification 
The study aims to use an econometric model to identify the association and causal 
relationship between bank credit and trade credit in South Africa. Basically, the study 
wishes to evaluate whether trade credit and bank credits are complements or 
substitutes as suggested by the literature (Smith, 1987; Mian and Smith, 1992; Wilner, 
2000; and Giannetti et al., 2008). To test this hypothesis, (based on Lin and Chou’s 
(2014) and Atanasova (2012) study), the model is estimated using the following 
equation: 
 
𝐵𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝐵1𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝐵1𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝐵6𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝐵7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (a) 
 
𝑖 and t refer to a firm and time period respectively. Bkloan is a dependent variable. 
Tpay, age, coverage, depr, leverage, and size, are all independent variables. Tpay is 
trade credit, age is the age of the firm i at time t, coverage is the ability to meet financial 
obligations (liquidity), depr is depreciable assets indicating collateral, leverage indicates 
debt level, and size is the size of the firm i at time t.   
 
Trade credit is measured by accounts payable. Many studies focusing on whether trade 
credit facilitates access to bank credit use accounts payable. Accounts payable are 
liabilities an enterprise owes because it purchased goods or services on credit from a 
supplier, while accounts receivable are assets an enterprise has a right to collect 
because it sold goods or services on credit to a customer. On the other hand, bank 
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credit is also a liability. Hence, the banks would only use information on how well an 
enterprise paid its creditors, but not how well its customers have paid back their debts.  
 
Bank credit is considered a dependent variable and trade credit an independent variable 
because the model intends to identify whether trade credit can facilitate access to bank 
credit. In addition to the substitution role that was determined by the earlier theories of 
trade credit, the recent and prominent theoretical study such as Biais and Gollier (1997), 
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) determined that these sources of finance could be 
considered as two complementary sources of financing enterprises. This theory posits 
that the use of trade credit can help to alleviate the credit constraints suffered by 
financially constrained firms. This theory focuses specifically on the firms that may 
suffer from imperfect information and the problem of credit rationing.  The theory argues 
that trade credit can provide a signal by revealing supplier’s information to the bank. 
Consequently, banks can be convinced to lend when suppliers also lend to their 
customers. This study focuses on the informational role of trade credit. The study does 
so by analysing whether trade credit can contribute to building a reputation for 
borrowers, or simply examine if the availability of trade credit facilitates access to bank 
credit.  
4.1.2. Measurement of variables and data sources  
4.1.2.1. Data sources 
The data in this study were obtained from Bureau Van Dijk (Orbis), which covers data 
from different industries. Bureau Van Dijk covers firms’ financial and nonfinancial 
information and business intelligence for individual countries, regions and the world. 
The database uses BVB proficiency with renowned information publishers to create 
information products.  The database has widespread coverage of private enterprises, 
detailed company hierarchies, standardised financial reports such that it is possible to 
compare financial strength metrics to assess the financial viability of enterprises. It 
combines 120 sources and covers approximately 150 million firms globally. 
Nevertheless, this study only utilised South Africa data and only select firms with 
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available data.  This study used the panel data from 2007 to 2015 for 174 firms in South 
Africa, based on the availability of information from Bureau Van Dijk. The Definition of 
SMEs in the National Small Business Act is an enterprise with fewer than 100 to 200 
employees, depending on Industry Less than R4 million to R50 million turnover and 
depending upon Industry Less than R2 million to R18 million assets. The study 
measured size based on turnover and assets. Based on assets, there were 58 large 
firms and 116 SMEs.  The study removed outliers in the highest 99th and lowest 1st 
percentile because it was not possible to determine if the outliers are bad data.  
4.1.2.2. Definition of indicators 
The measures of trade credit are usually the same across different studies. In this 
study, trade credit is measured by the ratio of: 
 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠⁄  (Tpay)  
This ratio signifies a firm’s dependence on trade credit and provides the percentage of 
total assets that is financed by trade credit. The data are collected directly from the 
firms’ balance sheet compiled by the Bureau Van Dijk (Orbis).  This is similar to the 
study by Lin and (Chou (2014) Alphonse, Ducret and Severin (2006), Rodriguez-
Rodriguez (2006) and Saito and Bandeira (2010). Access to other forms of credit or 
bank credit is represented by the ratio of  
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  (Bkloan). 
 
In determining whether to grant credit, banks look at the age of the firm. The reputation 
of the firm grows with the firm age. The notion that the provision of finance grows with 
the age of the firm is a well-established phenomenon in the literature (Berger and Udell, 
1998). Hence, a positive relationship between firm age and bank credit is expected. As 
in the many other studies such as Tsuruta (2008) and Ogawa et al. (2011), the variable 
age is measured by the natural logarithm of the period that passed between the date 
that the firms was founded and the year of measurement.  
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According to Alphonse et al. (2006) and Saito and Bandeira (2010), depreciable assets 
(DEPR/Total assets) play a collateral role, and banks might require collateral to grant 
credit. When lenders can observe firms’ creditworthiness, low-quality borrowers have to 
pledge collateral to obtain loans, while high-quality borrowers do not. Hence, 
(DEPRE/Total Assets) is used as a proxy for the firm’s ability to collateralise its debt. 
The theory also suggests that a firm is more likely to face credit constraints in different 
instances. Firstly, credit constraints could occur when a firm’s level of profits, assets, 
and tangibility are low and when its coverage (operating income-to-interest ratio) ratios 
is low. Secondly, credit constraints could occur when a firm’s leverage (DEBT/Total 
assets) ratio is high (Atanasova, 2007). Coverage is a measure of the firm’s ability to 
meet its financial obligations. Hence, it is expected to be positively related to banks 
credit. Leverage measures firm’s debt level and banks are less willing to offer credit to 
high leveraged firms.  Therefore, coverage and leverage ratios are included in the 
model.  
The study also includes the firm level variable that is crucial and is used by almost all 
trade credit studies; this is firm size. The more the assets a firm has, the more likely 
they would receive credit from the bank. For instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), and Li (2011) all use firm size as an 
independent variable. There are different proxies for firm size; total assets, total sales, 
and market capitalisation are the most prominent areas in empirical corporate finance 
research8. Hence, this study uses the natural logarithm of total assets and total sales as 
the measures of firm size.  
4.2. Methods and hypothesis testing 
This study intends to evaluate whether trade credit plays a signalling role for financial 
institutions as suggested by the literature (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Jain 2001; Burkart 
and Ellingsen 2004; Garcia-Appendini 2011). As suggested by these literatures, and on 
the literature of lending relationships if ever trade credit facilitates access to bank credit, 
                                                          
8 See http://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/isnie2015/li_dang.pdf. Accessed 30 January 2006  
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then trade credit (Tpay) should have a positive relationship with the amount of bank 
credit (B𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛). If trade credit has information content for the banks, the direction of 
causality should be such that trade credit causes bank credit.  
Alternatively, trade credit does not have information content. Hence, trade credit and 
bank credit are substitutes. The study first provides pooled, fixed and random effect 
model results to test for this. The Hausman test determines the selection between these 
methods. 
4.2.1. The pooled panel data model  
The pooled panel data model assumes that the intercept/constant values of all the firms 
are the same. It also assumes that the slope coefficients are identical for all the firms. 
Practically, the pooled panel data method implies that there are no differences between 
the estimated cross-sections and it is useful under the hypothesis that the data set is a 
“priori homogeneous” (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). However, this is restrictive and 
according to Asteriou and Hall (2007), cases of more interest would include and use 
fixed and random effects in the method of estimation. 
4.2.2. Fixed effect model  
The fixed effects model can be defined as a linear regression model with the intercept 
that differs across the individual unit (Verbeek, 2004) 𝑖, i.e.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 . Ɛ𝑖𝑡 ~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎Ɛ
2 )    (b) 
The method assumes that the value of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are independent of all Ɛ𝑖𝑡 . writing this in the 
usual regression framework by adding a dummy variable for each unit 𝑖 in the model 
would give the following; 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 +  𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡     (c) 
Where the dummy variable 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 1  if 𝑖 = 𝑗 and 0 elsewhere. Thus, the model has a set 
of N dummy variables. OLS can be used to estimate the parameters 𝑎1 − 𝑎𝑁 α and β. In 
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fixed effect model, the implied estimator for β is called the least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) estimator.  
The assumption that needs to be made is that all values of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are independent of all 
Ɛ𝑖𝑡 . The fixed effects estimator can be shown to be unbiased for β (Verbeek, 2004). If, 
in addition, normality of Ɛ𝑖𝑡  is imposed, βˆ Fixed effect has a normal distribution. For 
reliability, it is vital that  
𝐸{(𝑥𝑖𝑡 −-?̅?𝑖)Ɛ𝑖𝑡 } = 0            (d) 
Sufficient for this is that 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is uncorrelated with Ɛ𝑖𝑡  and that ?̅?𝑖 does not correlate with 
the error term.  In turn, this is implied by 
𝐸{𝑥𝑖𝑡 Ɛ𝑖𝑡 } = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖, 𝑡,     (e) 
In which case 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is considered or assumed to be a strictly exogenous variable. Hence, 
the value of 𝑋𝑖𝑡  should not depend on the past, current and future values of the error 
term. In some instances, this assumption can be very restrictive.  This condition 
excludes lagged dependent variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡  , but any 𝑋𝑖𝑡  variable that depends upon 
the history of 𝑌𝑖𝑡 would also violate the condition (Verbeek, 2004)
9.  
4.2.3. Random effects model  
The random effects model is considered as an alternative method of estimating this 
model. It is commonly assumed that a random error term can summarise the factors 
that have an effect on the dependent variable but not included as independent variables 
in the model. This leads to the hypothesis that the 𝑎𝑖 are the random factors that are 
independently and identically distributed over individuals (Verbeek, 2004). Therefore, 
the random effects model can be written as  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = µ + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑎𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 , Ɛ𝑖𝑡 ~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜀
2); 𝑎𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑎
2)        (f) 
Where 𝑎𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡  represent an error term which consists of an individual specific 
component (does not differ over the period), and a remainder component (assumed not 
                                                          
9 https://thenigerianprofessionalaccountant.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/modern-econometrics.pdf  
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to correlate over the period). This simply means that the correlation between all the 
error terms over the period is ascribed to the individual effects 𝑎𝑖. It is assumed that 𝑎𝑖 
and Ɛ𝑖𝑡  are jointly independent and independent of 𝑥𝑗𝑠. This suggests that the OLS 
estimator for µ and β, is not considered to be a biased and consistent estimation 
(Verbeek, 2004). The error components structure suggests that the composite error 
term 𝑎𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡  indicate some level of autocorrelation (unless 𝜎𝑎
2= 0). Thus, the standard 
errors for the OLS estimator are inappropriate. It is therefore necessary to consider a 
supplementary efficient generalised least squares (GLS) estimator that can be achieved 
by exploiting the structure of the error covariance matrix (Verbeek, 2004). 
4.2.4. Fixed Effects or Random Effects 
Choosing between the fixed effects and random effects methods comprises of 
examining whether the independent variables are correlated with an individual effect.  
The fixed effects method depends on the values for 𝑎𝑖. The fixed effect considers the 
distribution of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 given 𝑎𝑖, where the 𝑎𝑖 can be estimated. According to Verbeek (2004), 
this explanation is most appropriate when 𝑖 denote large number of countries, firms or 
industries, and the estimates needed are for a specific country, firm or industry. 
Inferences will thus be with respect to the effects that are in the sample firms of the 
study.  
As opposed to the fixed effect, the random effects approach does not depend on the 
individual 𝑎𝑖 𝑠, but integrates the individual 𝑎𝑖𝑠. Therefore, the concern is not on 
individuals 𝑎𝑖 but focus on random individuals that have definite characteristics.  
The random effects model can allow the study to interpret the results with respect to the 
characteristics of the population. Hence, the random effects model states that  
𝐸{𝑦𝑖𝑡 /𝑥𝑖𝑡 } = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽               (g) 
 
While the fixed effects model estimates 
𝐸{𝑦𝑖𝑡 /𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖} = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑎𝑖,      (h) 
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The β coefficients in these two estimates are the same only in cases where 𝐸{𝑎𝑖𝑡 /
𝑥𝑖𝑡 } = 0. In summary, a first motive for choosing the fixed effects model above is that 
some interest may lie in 𝑎𝑖, which may only be logical if the number of units is to a 
certain extent small and of a definite nature. That is, when it is important to identify 
individual units. However, according to Verbeek (2004), it is possible for the fixed effects 
estimator to be preferred where the interest lies in the large population of individual 
units, although random effects estimators may seem appropriate. This is possible in the 
cases where  𝑎𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡  are correlated, and the random effects model, ignoring the 
correlation as mentioned, may lead to unreliable estimators. The issue where individual 
effects , 𝑎𝑖 and the explanatory variables in 𝑥𝑖𝑡  are correlated can be controlled by 
means of the fixed effects model, which in effect disregard the, 𝑎𝑖 from the model, and 
thus disregards any problems that they may cause.  
Nevertheless, Hausman (1978) proposed a test under the null hypothesis that 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and 
𝑎𝑖  are not correlated. The overall notion of a Hausman test is to compare random and 
fixed effects estimators. One of the estimators (random or fixed effect) is reliable under 
both the null and alternative hypothesis and one that is only reliable under the null 
hypothesis. If there is a significant difference between the two estimators, the null 
hypothesis is not likely to hold. Hausman (1978) modified the test constructed on the 
idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation, both OLS and GLS are reliable but 
OLS is not consistent while under the alternative OLS is consistent. 
The Hausman test statistic cab be estimated as   
𝜉𝐻 = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)
′
 [?̂?{?̂?𝐹𝐸} − ?̂?{?̂?𝑅𝐸}]
−1
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸),        (i) 
The ?̂? denotes estimation of the true covariance conditions. Under the null hypothesis, 
chi-statistic 𝜉𝐻 has an asymptotic Chi-squared distribution with K df, K is the number of 
elements in β.  The null hypothesis implicitly declares that lim(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)=0. Therefore, 
the main aim of the Hausman test is to test whether the random effects and fixed effects 
estimator are significantly different. These two estimators can only be different if there is 
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correlation between𝑥𝑖𝑡  and 𝑎𝑖. According to Verbeek (2004), other sorts of 
misspecification may also read to rejection.  
4.3. The stationarity test  
The models above did not take the time series nature of the data into account and this 
might affect the quality of the results obtained using these models. To overcome this 
problem, the study subjects the variables to some time series test and uses panel time 
series techniques for estimation. The behaviour and properties of a series can be 
influenced significantly by stationarity. If two variables are trending over the period or if 
the regression is spurious, the regression could have a high R2 even if the variables are 
unrelated. If the test is performed and the variables in the regression model are 
discovered to be not stationary, it would serve as a proof that the standard assumptions 
for asymptotic analysis may not be valid. Specifically, the usual “t-ratios” would not 
follow a t-distribution if the series are not stationary. Hence, the study cannot reliably 
accept hypothesis tests about the regression parameters. In this study, the variable size 
across firms is likely to exhibit changing means and/or trends over time. 
Recent literatures have emphasised that the panel unit roots’ tests are better than 
univariate tests. A stationary series is integrated of order (d) if it is stationary after being 
differenced (d) times. Models with non-stationary variables are high likely to produce 
spurious regressions and provide unreliable test statistics. It can, however, be 
differenced appropriately, such that a non-stationary variable can transform and be a 
stationary variable (Harris and Sollis, 2003). The suitable number of differencing a non-
stationary variable is called the order of integration.  
Levin and Lin (1993) proposed the foundations for panel unit root tests. Now the most 
common panel stationary tests are Levin-Lin (LL), Im-Pesaran-Shin) (IPS) and 
Maddala-Wu10. For firms, heterogeneity could arise because of the dissimilarities of the 
firm’s management and the degree of development of each firm. Therefore, this study 
employs two different, panel unit root tests to determine if the variables in the model are 
                                                          
10 See http://spot.colorado.edu/~mcnownr/working_papers/panel-unit-root-tests.pdf  
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stationary or non-stationary. The tests used in this study are Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(IPS, 2003) test and Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller (Choi, 2001) test. Im, Pesaran 
and Shin and Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests reflect heterogeneity using 
individual effects and individual linear trends. 
The importance of using two different stationarity tests is to ensure that the model is 
estimated in non-volatile form and also to avoid tests with low power issue (Agu and 
Okechukwu, 2008). Choi (2001) considers the model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 (𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … . 𝑇𝑖)    (j) 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1 … . +𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is integrated of order zero 
(Agu and Okechukwu, 2008). Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests let each time 
series 𝑌𝑖𝑡, have a different sample size. Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller test also 
allows a different specification of non-stochastic and stochastic components depending 
on 𝑖. The null hypothesis of this test is that individual series are non-stationary; the 
alternative hypothesis is that some of the time series are stationary. 
IPS (2003) established a unit root test for dynamic heterogeneous panel data model 
that is based on the mean of the individual unit root statistics. Furthermore, they 
proposed a standardised T-bar test constructed from the ADF statistics averaged over 
the cross-section. The stochastic process 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is determined by the first-order 
autoregressive process (Agu and Okechukwu, 2008). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (1 − ɸ𝑖) + µ𝑖 + ɸ𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1+Ɛ𝑖𝑡     (k) 
The values of  𝑌𝑖0 , are given. The null hypothesis of the test, in the equation above can 
be expressed:  
Δ𝑌𝑖𝑡=𝑎𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1+Ɛ𝑖𝑡                          (l) 
 The null hypothesis is that each individual series in the panel has a unit root. 
Conversely, the alternative hypothesis allows for 𝑎𝑖 to differ across the groups. Hence, 
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in both tests, if the study accepts the null hypothesis, the relevant series is not 
stationary against the alternative hypothesis that the series is stationary.  
4.4. The co-integration test  
The major purpose of conducting a panel co-integration test is to identify if there is any 
long-term correlation between variables. Besides that, co-integration can be utilised to 
test for the spurious regression that may emanate from the non-stationary series. For 
panel co-integration test, several procedures can be used starting from the basis of the 
traditional Johansen maximum likelihood approach to Engle-Granger approach.  
4.2.1. Engle-Granger approach 
Two panel co-integration tests have been established under the Engle and Granger 
(1987). These consist of Kao (1999) test and Pedroni (2000) test. The Kao test is based 
on the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) methods. This test 
determines the stationarity of residuals as a way to evaluate if there is a co-integration 
relationship. However, the Kao test has restrictive assumptions. The Kao test assumes 
that co-integration vector and coefficients are homogeneous. Several multiple 
independent variables are not permissible in the co-integration vector and it caters for a 
single unique co-integration relationship.  
The Pedroni test is superior compared to the Kao test because it relaxes several 
assumptions that the Kao test possesses. Pedroni test allows the co-integration vector 
to differ across units of the panel. It also allows error terms across the groups to have 
the heterogeneity effects. Moreover, the test includes several variables in the co-
integration vector and control for the endogeneity bias in the OLS.  
Pedroni (1997; 1999) established a panel co-integration method that is residual-based. 
This test allows individual effects, slope coefficients and individual linear trends to be 
more heterogeneous across the cross-section. Pedroni (2004) considered the following:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡    (m) 
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The test assumes that  𝑌𝑖𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are integrated I (1) and the factors 𝑎𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖  do not 
discriminate the possibility of individual effects and individual linear trends. 𝛽𝑖 coefficient 
is allowed to differ between different individuals. Therefore, the co-integrating vectors 
may be unrelated across the firms in the panel.  
Pedroni (1999) has also determined the small sample performances of seven 
measurements to test panel data co-integration by deriving the asymptotic distributions. 
The first four Pedroni test statistics are based on pooling the “within” measurement 
consisting of panel-parametric (adf) statistics, panel non-parametric (pp), panel-rho, and 
panel-v. The last three Pedroni test statistics are based on the “between” measurement; 
consisting of group-adf statistics, group-pp and group-rho. The null hypothesis for these 
test  is 𝐻0 : ?̂?𝑖 = 1  and the alternative hypotheses are 𝐻1 : ?̂?𝑖 = ?̂? < 1  𝐻1: ?̂? < 1 and for 
the first four tests and the last three tests, respectively.  Having done the stationarity 
test, the study will also utilise the Tobit model followed by the GMM method as 
explained below.  
4.5. Tobit method 
James Tobin (1958) proposed the Tobit model. The method was constructed as an 
extension of the probit model.  It can be used to describe the association between a 
dependent variable that does not have any negative value and an independent variable. 
If the information on the dependent variable is available only for some observations in 
the sample, it is known as a censored sample. Therefore, the Tobit model is also called 
a censored regression model. Censoring arises when some information on the 
dependent variable is lost but not on the independent variables. According to Verbeek 
(2004), it is possible for the dependent variable to be continuous but may have a 
constrained range probably if the dependent variable equals to zero for a considerable 
portion of the population but positive for the remaining portion of the population. This 
can be given by the following: 
𝑦 = 𝑦∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ > 0    (n) 
𝑦 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ ≤ 0      (o) 
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Therefore, for instance, if a firm decides to borrow a negative amount 𝑦∗, it 
automatically borrow nothing from the bank. This gives the standard Tobit model, which 
can be estimated as follows: 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥′𝑖𝛽 + Ɛ𝑖       (p) 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
∗  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0   (q) 
𝑦𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 0    (r) 
The model that assumes Ɛ𝑖  to be NID(0, 𝜎
2) and it is independent of 𝑥𝑖.  This is a 
standard regression model, where all the negative values are recorded as zeros. 
The Tobit model utilises all the information, including information on censoring and 
provides consistent estimates. It is estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation techniques. James Heckman proposed an alternative to the ML method. It is 
more probable for the Heckman (1976) procedure to yield consistent estimates of the 
parameters of the equation above, but they are not as efficient as the ML estimates 
(Gujarati, 2004). Moreover, most modern statistical software packages have the ML 
routine (including eviews); hence, this study used the ML estimation technique. 
The Tobit regression is proposed for a dependent variable censored either at the lower 
end or at the upper end of its distribution or both. Censoring is essentially a problem of 
floor and ceiling effects. This study uses a Tobit model because the dependent variable 
is censored at zero. It is either a firm has a bank credit or not it cannot be negative 
(bank credit is censored at the lower end). Hence, Tobit method is appropriate to run 
this model.  
There are a number of ways to interpret coefficients in the Tobit model. For instance, 
the odds of a zero outcome in the Tobit model is described as 
𝑝{𝑦𝑖 = 0} = 1 − ɸ(𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽/ 𝜎)    (s) 
This means the interpretation of β/𝜎 can determine the marginal effect of a change in 
𝑥𝑖𝑘 on the probability of observing zero outcomes. That is, 
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𝜕𝑃{𝑦𝑖=0}
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑘
= 𝜙(𝑥′𝑖𝛽/ 𝜎)
𝛽𝑘
𝜎
        (t) 
Moreover, the Tobit model estimates the expected value of 𝑦𝑖 given that it has a positive 
value. This indicates that the marginal effect of a change in 𝑥𝑖𝑘 on the value of 𝑦𝑖 , given 
the censoring is different from 𝛽𝑘 (Verbeek, 2004) . Hence, it follows that the expected 
value of 𝑦𝑖 is given by 
𝐸{𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽 ɸ(𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽/ 𝜎) + 𝜎𝜙(𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽/ 𝜎)    (u) 
Therefore, the marginal effect on the expected value of 𝑦𝑖 of a change in 𝑥𝑖𝑘 is given by 
𝜕𝐸{𝑦𝑖}
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝛽𝑘 ɸ(𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽/ 𝜎).      (v) 
This indicates that the marginal effect of a change in 𝑥𝑖𝑘 is given by the coefficient 
multiplied by the probability of having a positive outcome. Therefore, if the probability is 
equals to 1 for a particular cross-section, the marginal effect is the same as 𝛽𝑘 similar to 
the linear model. Lastly, the marginal effect on the latent variable is easily obtained as  
𝜕𝐸{𝑦𝑖
∗}
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑘
= 𝛽𝑘      (w) 
4.6. GMM method 
Hansen (1982) was the first to make GMM estimation formal. GMM has become one of 
the most used methods of estimation. Unlike the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation, 
GMM relaxes the requirement to have a full knowledge of the distribution of the data. 
The GMM method estimations are directly from the moment conditions that are in the 
model. The GMM estimator is based on general characteristics of the population, as is 
the case in the classical likelihood-based framework. 
GMM requires fewer and weaker assumptions compared to the classical likelihood-
based framework. In order to provide an objective function, GMM only makes 
assumptions about the moments of the random variables. The moments of the random 
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variables are known as the population moments. The data provide the sample 
moments. Hence, GMM minimises the objective function to select the parameters that 
yield the smallest differences between the population moments and the sample 
moments (Casey and O’Toole, 2014). 
The relationship between trade credit and bank credit may be a correlation running from 
bank credit to trade credit or a reverse correlation, and previous bank credit affects the 
probability of getting bank credit in the current period. Therefore, bank credit is 
potentially endogenous, which may lead to inconsistent estimations of the model. To 
identify the relationship between trade credit and bank credit correctly and deal with the 
endogeneity problem, the study exploits the panel nature of the data used in this study 
and includes the lagged values of the bank credit in the analysis. To address the 
potential problem of reverse causality the study used GMM model, which makes it 
possible to control for endogeneity by using instruments (Casey and O’Toole, 2014). 
The study first utilised the estimation strategy that was proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991).  In addition, Arellano and Bond (1991)  proposed the use of all the explanatory 
variables lagged as instruments. Their method assumes that there is no second-order 
serial correlation in the errors in first differences.  
However, if some value of 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is missing, then both ∆ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and ∆ 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 will be missing when 
the data are transformed using Arellano and Bond’s (1991) approach. Therefore, it is 
necessary to use the alternative transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
which is called orthogonal deviations transformation. In contrast to first difference 
transformation that subtracts previous period value from the present period value, the 
orthogonal deviations transformation subtracts the average of all observations from the 
present value. Orthogonal deviations are computable for all periods except the last 
period, even in the presence of gaps in the panel. All explanatory variables are used as 
instruments. 
Another estimation problem may come from the fact that the relationship between bank 
credit and trade credit may not always be the possibility of correlation that may run from 
bank credit to trade credit or a reverse correlation. Nevertheless, a spurious relationship 
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or correlation may be attributed to unobservable individual heterogeneity among firms. 
By using panel data, the endogeneity caused by a spurious relationship can be solved. 
4.7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to determine the methodology and the set of 
data that this study used. This study has used the panel-data approach to explore the 
relationship between trade credit and bank credit using a fixed effects model/random 
effect model. Lin and Chou (2014) employed this method as it is more recent and 
capture more information than many other previous studies. The study further used 
Tobit and GMM methods.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS 
5.0. Introduction 
Chapter 4 has set the analytical framework and the model estimation technique used in 
this study in order to analyse the association between trade credit and bank credit in 
South Africa. This chapter applies the model developed in the previous chapter and the 
other techniques that were discussed. The results from this chapter are used to address 
the objectives set out in the first chapter. The results presented include those of unit 
root, the results of pooled data, fixed and random effect model and determination of 
which method is more appropriate are presented in the first section. After determining 
the most suitable method, discussion of the association between trade credit and bank 
credit is highlighted in section two. Moreover, to identify if the results are robust, the 
study tests the model using other measures of some variables and the Tobit and GMM 
methods. By doing this, the study determines whether the results provide the same 
conclusion about the correlation between trade credit and bank credit or not. 
5.1. Stationarity/Unit root test results  
In this study, one informal test for stationarity and two formal tests are employed. The 
study first utilises the graphical analysis of the series. This is a graphic plot of the series. 
It is an essential step to show a graphical analysis before pursuing any formal tests. It is 
possible to detect any data capturing errors and structural breaks and gives an idea of 
the trends and stationarity of the data set before performing a formal test. The figures in 
the appendix display plots of all variables considered for the model. 
All variables except for Coverage could be stationary or closer as they seem to be 
moving around their means and indicate constant variances over time but some 
variables are not so clear. A conclusion can be reached that these variables are 
stationary in levels, that is, they are integrated of order zero based on the graphical 
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analysis. Size variable seems to be trending downward. However, it is important to 
perform a formal test, as it is required to ensure the stationarity status of the variables, 
especially for the variables that are not following a clear trend. 
Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller and the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) test are applied 
to examine the stationary properties of the series. The null hypothesis of the all the tests 
is that the series has a unit root.  
Table 3: Panel unit root test 
Variables  Fisher ADF  IPS 
 Levels Levels 
BKLOAN 585.467*** -8.54741*** 
TPAY 668.230*** -9.04153*** 
AGE 2333.35*** -254.866*** 
COVERAGE 883.001*** -31.6967*** 
DEPR 577.171*** -13.7703*** 
LEVERAGE 563.098*** -65.4680*** 
SIZE 522.605*** -20.0301*** 
*** And indicate significance at the 1% level. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on the Bureau Van Dijk (2007-2015) 
database 
 
Table 3 indicates the results of the panel unit root tests for the order of panel 
integration. The lags are based on Schwarz information criterion from Eviews. This 
assumes that the null hypothesis of each individual series is non-stationary. 
Both Im, Pesaran and Shin test and Fisher Augmented Dickey–Fuller test provides the 
same results. The null hypothesis of the unit roots is strongly rejected at the 1% 
significance level at all levels. All results from the panel integration suggest that it is not 
necessary to do a co-integration test and the panel relationship can be examined within 
a time stationary framework. 
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5.2. Results 
Table 4 indicates the results from the five methods and table 5 indicates the results from 
three applicable methods using the lagged trade credit as a variable of interest. When 
examining the results of the pooled regression, it can be identified that all the 
coefficients are individually statistically significant. Bkloan is negatively related to Tpay. 
The explanation for disregarding the results of the pooled regression model is in the 
appendix.  When examining the results of fixed effect model, it can be noted that all the 
coefficients except for Coverage and Size are individually statistically significant. The 
Random effect model provides results where, Tpay, Age, Coverage and Size 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Although some variables are not individually 
significant, they are jointly significant when implementing an F-test. Before explaining 
the result, it is important to determine the preferable model between random and fixed 
effect model. 
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Table 4: Regression results 
Variables Pooled data Fixed Effect Random effect Tobit GMM 
 Bkloan Bkloan Bkloan Bkloan Bkloan 
Coefficient 
 
Marginal 
effect 
 
Constant 0.084020 
(0.000608) 
*** 0.058923 
(0.056418) 
 0.115333 
(0.048453) 
*** 0.070407 
(0.031894) 
 
** 
0.062687 
(0.018933) 
0.024985 ***   
Bkloan(-1)            0.209433 
(0.026433) 
 
Tpay 0.035915 
(0.000653) 
*** -0.075982 
(0.033811) 
** -0.104342 
(0.033539) 
*** -0.035706 
(0.026592) 
 0.057074 
(0.020396) 
0.022748 *** -0.075849 
(0.037332) 
** 
Age 0.000362 
(8.74E-05) 
*** 0.012364 
(0.005832) 
** 0.006275 
(0.005970) 
 0.006124 
(0.004035) 
 -0.001099 
(0.002730) 
-.000438  0.012387 
(0.006544) 
** 
Coverage -1.90E-07 
(8.22E-09) 
*** 9.10E-09 
(1.58E-07) 
   -1.84E-08 
(1.57E-07) 
 -2.46E-05 
(1.39E-05) 
-.804953 * -7.78E-07 
(2.87E-06) 
 
Quick     0.006418 
(0.001114) 
***        
Depr 0.041226 
(0.001949) 
*** 0.160364 
(0.049271) 
*** 0.125689 
(0.049166) 
*** 0.146314 
(0.047084) 
*** 0.053763 
(0.060321) 
0.021428  0.139285 
(0.045929) 
*** 
Leverage 0.020637 
(0.000682) 
*** -0.148405 
(0.020564) 
*** -0.153816 
0.019831 
*** -0.116246 
(0.019022) 
*** 0.036999 
(0.021259) 
0.014746 * -0.135827 
(0.020066) 
*** 
Size -0.002273 
(5.14E-05) 
*** -0.001019 
(0.004462) 
   -0.001084 
(0.002598) 
 -0.001130 
(0.001605) 
-.000450  0.004245 
(0.004701) 
 
SizeS    -0.002741 
(0.003752) 
ADJ-R2 0.007464  0.568528    0.111443      
F*J stats 1088.725 *** 12.11279 ***   0.036979 ***    14.57733 
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Hausman         31.157777 ***         
obs 1148              1148    1137   1148     894   
***, **,* means statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels and Standard Error in parentheses 
Source: Author’s own computation based on the Bureau Van Dijk (2007-2015) database 
Table 5: Lagged trade credit results 
Variables Fixed Effect Tobit      GMM   
 Bkloan Bkloan   Bkloan 
 
 
 Coefficient Marginal effect 
Constant 0.081870 
(0.017934) 
*** 0.090256 
(0.020870) 
0.035997 
 
***   
Bkloan(-1)      0.208791 *** 
Tpay(-2) 0.015106 
(0.008910) 
* 0.086588 
(0.021769) 
0.034534 *** 
 
0.041680 
(0.034158) 
 
Age 0.001013 
(0.002691) 
 -0.004161 
(0.003203) 
-0.001659  0.015502 
(0.008578) 
* 
 
Coverage -5.06E-07 
(5.66E-07) 
 -2.51E-05 
(1.47E-05) 
-1.001076 * 
 
-9.95E-07 
(2.89E-06) 
 
 
Depr 0.039067 
(0.019721) 
** 0.031573 
(0.068151) 
0.012592  0.126960 
(0.056637) 
** 
 
Leverage -0.079320 
(0.011150) 
*** 0.071792 
(0.023894) 
0.028633 * 
 
-0.112515 
(0.022467) 
 
*** 
Size -0.001226 
(0.001099) 
 -0.002987 
(0.001749) 
-0.001191 
 
 0.003030 
(0.005257) 
 
 
ADJ-R2 0.568528       
F*J stats 12.11279 ***    9.91E-30 
obs 1148  899   766  
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***, **,* means statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels and Standard Error in parentheses 
Source: Author’s own computation based on the Bureau Van Dijk (2007-2015) database 
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In most cases, when the panel is balanced, it might be expected that the fixed effects 
model is consistent (Ranjan and Agrawal, 2011). Random effects model may be more 
suitable where the sample encompasses limited observations of the existing cross-
sectional units. The Hausman test was proposed to determine the suitable approach 
between the fixed effects and random effects methods. 
The Hausman test assumes that if the error terms are correlated with each other, then 
Fixed Effect is not suitable since assumptions may not be correct and then the study 
would need to be reliant on random effects results.  Hausman test is a technique that is 
used to distinguish between fixed effects model and random effects model in the panel 
data. The Random effects model is desirable under the null hypothesis due to the 
probability of greater efficiency, under the alternative hypothesis, the fixed effects model 
is suitable and thus preferred. According to Hausman and Taylor (1981), any rejection 
of the null hypothesis also suggests that the fixed effects and random effects model are 
different and, hence, that the fixed effects should be preferred over the random effects. 
The result of the standard Hausman test reported in Table 4 indicates the “orthogonality 
hypothesis” of the unobservable individual specific effects, and the study rejects the null 
hypotheses that the Random effect model is preferable. 
The study also employs Tobit model. The findings are provided in the next section. In 
the context of panel data used in this study, there is a need to deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity. This can be done by applying the within transformation, as it was done in 
this study by using the one-way fixed effects models. T can also be done by taking first 
differences. The ability of first differencing to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity 
motivates the family of estimators that have been developed for dynamic panel data 
models. These models contain one or more lagged dependent variables. Hence, this 
study further used GMM model and the explanation of which was provided under 
Chapter 4.  
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5.3. Findings: fixed effect, Tobit, and GMM model 
According to Teixeira (2008), in many instances, banks may avoid the fixed cost 
involved in screening and monitoring some enterprises. In analysing the results 
presented in Table 4, the study observes that the variable trade credit (Tpay) borne a 
negative sign and is significantly related to bank credit (Bkloan) for South African firms 
using both fixed effect and GMM model. Both models confirm a statistical significance at 
5% level. This indicates a substitute relationship between bank credit and trade credit 
consistent with Molina and Preve (2012), and Atanasova (2007) studies. Tobit model 
provides different results, where Tpay has a positive sign and significant at 1% level. 
This indicates a complementary relationship, which is consistent with Psillaki and 
Eleftheriou (2014) that provided empirical support for the redistribution and signalling 
role or motive of trade credit. The change on the sign of the coefficient indicates that the 
model is not robust to estimation technique used. 
As expected, firm’s age has a positive sign and the relationship between variable age 
and Bkloan is statistically significant at 5% level using both fixed effect and GMM model. 
This confirms a priori expectation that the older the firm, the better the prospect to get 
bank credit. It is usually the case that the longer the firm exists, the more it can create a 
good or a bad reputation. This result is consistent to Atanasova (2007) and Cuñat 
(2007) findings.  
Also meeting the priori expectation and consistent with Alphonse et al. (2006) and Saito 
and Bandeira (2010) is the variable Depr. Alphonse et al. (2006) and Saito and 
Bandeira (2010) stated that banks might require collateral to grant credit. Collateral is 
another means to overcome information asymmetries to prevent asset substitution from 
firms and credit rationing from banks. The variable Depr is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level using fixed and GMM model. Tobit model provides a positive 
relationship between Depr and Bkloan, but not of statistical significance.   
Unlike collateral, the liquidity is a direct measure of a firm's ability to meet its financial 
obligations. All measures of liquidity (coverage and quick) have positive signs but 
coverage is not statistically significant. This conforms to a priori expectations that the 
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higher the coverage, the more likely the firm is to get a bank credit. This suggests that 
the coverage has an impact on the Bkloan although the effect is not large enough to 
produce a statistically significant impact when using the fixed effect and GMM model. 
However, using the Tobit model, the positive relationship between Coverage and 
Bkloan is statistically significant at 10% level. This is consistent with Atanasova (2007).  
Leverage is also an important measure to determine if the enterprise is credit worthy.  
The more indebted the firm, the less likely it can access bank credit. Consistent with 
Atanasova (2007), this is indicated by a negative relationship between Leverage and 
Bkloan. This is only true when using the fixed effect and GMM model, which provided 
negative and statistically significant results at 1% level. On the other hand, Tobit model 
provides a positive sign significant at 10% level.  
Of the sample enterprises, all the measures of size (assets and sales) have negative 
signs and are not significant in all three models. The sign is, however, positive under the 
GMM model. Although the priori expectation was that the bigger the firm, the better the 
prospect to get bank credit, the negative relationship is consistent with Gama and 
Mateus (2010). However, these impacts are not large enough to provide statistically 
significant results.  
The model was re-estimated using the lagged Tpay using fixed effect, GMM and Tobit 
methods. The lagged Tpay is positively related to Bkloan when using all methods. This 
indicates that, when using lagged trade credit as a variable of interest, the model 
becomes robust to estimation techniques used. This result supports the findings made 
by Teixeira (2008). From the results obtained for the variable lagged Tpay, the study 
could argue that trade credit can be used as a way to signal the firm’s quality, as 
suggested by Biais and Gollier (1997). This can help enterprises build a good reputation 
and borrow at low cost. Hence, trade credit can reveal the private information of the 
supplier to the banks, and mitigate the information asymmetry. In turn, this can update 
banks beliefs about the customer default risk (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and 
Ellingsen, 2004). This finding is consistent with Gama and Mateus’ (2010) study. 
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As it can be observed, the results from GMM models are comparable to that of fixed 
effect model. Tobit model provides different finding from the other models and also 
provide a positive relationship between current values of Tpay and Bkloan, indication 
that this model is not robust to estimation technique. In contrast, all models provide a 
positive relationship between previous values of Tpay and current values of Bkloan, 
confirming that, trade credit reveals the private information of the supplier to the banks 
and provides signals for creditworthiness. In addition, the dynamic nature of GMM 
model provided that the previous bank credit affects the probability of getting bank credit 
in the current period. The lagged Bkloan is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. In addition, tests were done to check the robustness of the findings of the study 
using the alternative way of measuring some variable; this is discussed in the appendix.  
5.4. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, the main objective was to verify the association between trade 
(Tpay) credit and bank credit (Bkloan) in South Africa. Before performing this 
investigation, this study first tests the stationarity. The null hypothesis of the unit roots 
was strongly rejected at the 1% significance level at all levels. All results from the panel 
integration suggested that the panel relationship could be examined within a time 
stationary framework. 
The study used five different methods and interpreted three of them to identify whether 
these three approaches are compatible with each other or not. Using the fixed effect 
and GMM models, it was identified that trade credit is negatively related to bank credit; 
hence, it can be concluded that bank loan and trade credit are substitutes in South 
Africa. Nevertheless, Tobit model provided a positive relationship indicating that the 
model is not robust to estimation techniques used. 
Nevertheless, the lagged trade credit is positively related to bank credit using all three 
methods, indicating that trade credit information facilitates bank credit. This model as 
indicated in table 5 is robust to estimation techniques. To sum up, some enterprises 
may be credit rationed by banks and may have to use trade credit as a source of 
external finance. After a while, trade credit data enable firms to build their reputation. 
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The firm can then be considered as high-quality borrowers and start to gain access to 
bank credit.  
In that context, it is, therefore, possible for trade credit to play the signalling role of 
borrower quality to uninformed banks. Depending on the situation of the enterprise, 
trade credit and bank credit can then be considered as substitutes using the current 
trade credit and complementary sources of finance using the previous trade credit. 
Although some variables are not individually significant, they are jointly significant when 
implementing an F-test. However, just like Kwenda and Holden (2014), the use annual 
financial statements, as the main source of data is the main limitation of this study. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
6.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides the conclusion about the research question and puts forward 
policy recommendations and suggestions for future research. Trade credit theories have 
stimulated research on identifying whether trade credit is a substitute or is 
complementary to bank credit. The theories and empirical evidence in Chapter 2 
indicated that trade credit plays a role in financial intermediation. Most of the earlier 
theories and empirical evidence supported the contention that trade credit and bank 
credit are substitutes. On the other hand, recent studies indicate that trade credit and 
bank credit are complimentary. The complementary role can be either in a form of 
redistributive hypothesis or signalling role of trade credit. The complementary role that is 
most supported in the recent studies is the signalling role of trade credit.  
The first objective of the study was to analyse the lending condition in South Africa. The 
analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that the South African financial sector and credit 
bureaus are well-developed. However, it was identified that regardless of the level of 
development in the financial sector, South Africa’s financial sector does not meet the 
funding demand of many enterprises. The study employed various quantitative 
indicators to determine financial sector and trade credit use. To determine the role that 
trade credit can play to ensure access to the most efficient bank financing, trade credit 
was compared to bank credit.  
The second objective of the study was to identify whether there was a relationship 
between selected measures of bank credit and trade credit in South Africa. Chapter 4 
describes the methodology used. Trade credit was measured by accounts payable and 
lagged accounts payable. Many studies focusing on whether trade credit facilitates 
access to bank credit use accounts payable. Bank credit was considered a dependent 
variable and trade credit an independent variable of interest because the model 
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intended to identify whether trade credit can facilitate access to bank credit. In Chapter 
5, the study observed that the variable trade credit was significantly related to bank 
credit for South African firms using both fixed effect and GMM model. This indicated a 
substitute relationship between bank credit and trade credit consistent with Molina and 
Preve (2012), and Atanasova (2007) studies. Tobit model provided different results, 
where trade credit had a positive sign and significant at 1% level. This indicated a 
complementary relationship, which is consistent with Psillaki and Eleftheriou (2014) that 
provided empirical support for the redistribution and signalling role or motive of trade 
credit. The model was however not robust to estimation technique used. The model was 
re-estimated using the lagged trade credit using fixed effect, GMM and Tobit methods. 
The lagged trade credit was positively related to Bkloan when using all methods. This 
indicates that, when using lagged trade credit as a variable of interest, the model 
became robust to estimation techniques used. This result supported the findings made 
by Teixeira (2008). Hence, the study argued that trade credit can be used as a way to 
signal the firm’s quality, as suggested by Biais and Gollier (1997). This can help 
enterprises to build a good credit record and reputation and borrow at lower cost. 
Hence, trade credit can mitigate the information asymmetry by updating banks beliefs 
about the customer default risk (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
Based on the findings, the following section addresses the fourth objective of this study. 
Specifically proposes policy measures that can improve information sharing and access 
to credit by enterprises. 
6.1. Policy Recommendations  
In the light of the above, the following recommendations are drawn from this study: 
 As the relationship between the lagged trade credit and bank credit is positive, South 
Africa should gear its policies toward creating and strengthening information sharing 
between trade credit providers and banks. Trade credit reporting is still underdeveloped 
and not common practice in the South African market. The following regulatory steps 
should be considered:  
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 Some measures such as creating credit bureaus that focus on reporting trade credit 
information could contribute towards lessening the information asymmetry hence, 
the NCR should initiate the establishment of credit bureaus focusing on reporting 
trade credit information.  
 Suppliers, especially small players, should be incentivised to report trade credit data 
to already existing credit bureaus. In addition, the credit bureaus should be 
incentivised to make an effort to obtain trade credit information. Trade credit data 
comes from several sources, and often the sources are not equipped to report 
accurately on their customers. These could be combined and correlated through 
credit bureaus. 
 Many countries  collect trade credit data for commercial lending, South Africa can 
learn from these countries on procedures they followed to ensure that trade credit 
information is reported to the credit registry/bureaus. 
 Policies that support the development of technologies for the evaluation and 
monitoring of firms that are negatively affected by information asymmetry by being 
bank credit rationed might also be more effective. 
Since trade credit was also considered to be a substitute for bank credit, the trade credit 
market should be regulated as an alternative source of finance. Firms should also 
establish a long-term relationship with their suppliers since trade credit is an important 
source of funding. 
6.2. Areas for further research 
 Research on trade credit has been lacking in South Africa and African countries as a 
whole. Therefore, there is a need to conduct more studies focusing on trade credit. 
However, lack of data in this area is a limitation that should be addressed, especially as 
far as small businesses are concerned. According to Kwenda and Holden (2014), 
financial statements is open to manipulation by managers. Any overestimation or 
underestimation could compromise the results of this study. Hence, the use of annual 
financial statements data as the main source of data is the main limitation of this study. 
Managers cannot manipulate the data from the statistics department of a country, and it 
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could be beneficial for Statistic South Africa to start collecting trade credit data. Since 
access to finance is an important element for firms’ growth, further research should be 
devoted towards the exact mechanism to address the lack of access to finance.  
There are also many important issues not directly addressed in this paper, such as 
dividing results between small and large firms and macroeconomic11 considerations 
such as the monetary policy. This is partly owed to the focus on the immediate concern 
of this study, but also partly due to data limitations. Further research is needed to 
identify if the results would differ between small and large firms by looking at the sample 
of small and large firms separately. For instance, Nilsen (2002), and Alatalo (2010) 
looked at small and large firms separately and found different results between the two 
groups, and Agostino and Trivieri (2014) and Alphonse et al (2006) focused just on 
small firms.  
Moreover, in support of Kim and Lee (2014), all studies in this area only consider two 
credit instruments, namely, trade credit and bank credit. These are the most important 
ones, but firms use a more diverse set of credit instruments and some of which have 
intermediate properties between bank credit and trade credit. Therefore, there is a need 
for a theoretical extension to include other credit and funding instruments such as bonds 
and equity finance. 
  
                                                          
11 The main objective of the study was not to identify how this nexus changes during expansionary and 
contractionary macroeconomics. 
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Appendix 
a) Fixed effect and pooled data model 
The standard F -test is used to check fixed effects against the Pooled data model.  The 
null hypothesis is that all the constants are the same and that therefore the pooled data 
method is applicable:  
𝐻0 :   𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑧 = ⋯ = 𝑎𝑁 
 
The F statistic is: 
𝐹 =
(𝑅𝐹𝐸
2 − 𝑅𝐶𝐶
2 ) /(𝑁 −  1)
( 1 −  𝑅𝐹𝐸
2 ) /(𝑁𝑇 −  𝑁 −  𝑘)
~𝐹(𝑁 −  1, 𝑁𝑇 −  𝑁 −  𝑘) 
𝑅𝐹𝐸
2   Is the coefficient to determine the fixed effects model, and 𝑅𝐶𝐶
2  is the coefficient to 
determine the pooled data model. If F-statistical is bigger than the F-critical or 
statistically significant, then we reject the null hypothesis. 
Traditionally, panel data estimation has been mostly applied to data sets where N is 
very large and in this case, a simplifying assumption may be made which gives rise to 
the random effects model, as explained below (Asteriou and Hall, 2007) 
To recap, the pooled panel data model assumes that the intercept/constant values of all 
the firms are the same and that the slope coefficients are all identical for all the firms. 
These are restricted assumptions; therefore, despite its simplicity, the pooled regression 
may distort the true picture of the relationship between trade credit and bank credit 
across 41 South African firms. These assertions need to be supported by appropriate 
statistical test (F-test) which is discussed below. 
b) F- Test 
The standard F -test can be used to check fixed effects against the Pooled, data model.  
The null hypothesis is that all the constants are the same (homogeneity) and that 
therefore the pooled data method is applicable. The F-statistic is statistically significant, 
hence, the null hypotheses that all the constants are the same can be rejected, and 
conclude that the pooled data method is not applicable. 
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What is now needed is to determine some way to take into account the specific nature 
of the firms. One way to take into account the individuality of each cross-sectional unit is 
to let the constant vary for each firm but still assume that the slope coefficients are 
constant across firms. 
c) Graphical analyses for stationarity 
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Figure 6: Bkloan graphical analyses 
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Figure 7: Tpay graphical analyses 
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Figure 8: Age graphical analyses 
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Figure 9: Coverage graphical analyses 
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Figure 10: Depr graphical analyses 
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Figure 11: Leverage graphical analyses 
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Figure 12: Size graphical analyses 
Source: Author’s computation using Eviews 7 Econometric Package 
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d) Robustness test 
The study conducted estimations using alternative proxies to firm size (the natural 
logarithm of sales and the natural logarithm of total assets). The study also used 
another proxy to measure liquidity (Coverage ratio and Quick ratio). Using these 
proxies, Tpay remains negative and statistically significant at 1% level. The 
independent variable Age retains a positive sign, but become statistically 
insignificant. Size, when measured by the natural logarithm of sales, remains 
negative and statistically insignificant. Depr retains a positive sign and statistically 
significant at 1% level. Leverage retains a negative sign and statistically significant 
at 1% level. In addition, when liquidity is measured by a quick ratio; the sign remains 
positive, but becomes statistically significant at 1% level. Hence, the findings are 
similar to that of the main models and there were no significant changes to the signs 
of the independent variables as a result of changing the way to measure some 
variables.  
 
